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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2012, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took
to the streets of Barcelona, in the Spanish region of Catalonia. What began
as a celebration of Catalonia’s national holiday turned into the largest
display of Catalan nationalist sentiment in recent memory, with marchers
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waving red, blue, and gold Catalan flags and carrying banners adorned with
slogans such as “Independence Now!” and “Catalonia: the New European
State.”1 Almost overnight, Catalan independence went from an obscure
nationalist dream to a real possibility, with ramifications for the futures of
both Spain and the European Union (EU).
The demonstration in Barcelona was a striking example of the
nationalism that has recently gained ascendancy in several of the EU’s
most prominent stateless nations. In Belgium’s June 2010 elections, the
separatist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, or N-VA) won
the plurality of votes, triggering a record-setting political stalemate that left
Belgium without a functioning national government for over 530 days and
causing many observers to predict that the Belgian state would soon come
apart at the seams.2 In May 2011, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won a
majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament and immediately announced
plans to hold a referendum on severing Scotland’s centuries-old union with
England.3 Scotland’s referendum is scheduled for 2014.4
At first blush, the salience of separatist nationalism within the
democracies of Western Europe might seem anomalous or even comical.
Talk of secession in Europe calls to mind the deadly seriousness of the
Balkan wars of the 1990s; by contrast, the ethno-linguistic division at the
heart of Belgium’s political troubles has been characterized as “a (very)
civilized war as told by Dr. Seuss, with the French-speaking Walloons on
one side and the Dutch-speaking Flemings on the other.”5 Underscoring
the incongruity of these nationalist movements is the ongoing process of
European integration, often viewed as having ushered in a “post1. Fiona Ortiz & Julien Toyer, Vast Crowds Demand Catalan Autonomy from Crisis-Hit Spain,
REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-spain-cataloniaidUSBRE88A19U20120911.
2. Stephen Castle & Steven Erlanger, Vote Widens Divide Between Flemish- and FrenchSpeaking Regions, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/europe/
14belgium.html; Angelique Chrisafis, Eurozone Crisis Forces Belgium to Finally Form a Government,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2011, 14:56 EST, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/01/eurozone-crisisforces-belgium-government.
3. Severin Carrell, Stunning SNP Election Victory Throws Spotlight on Scottish Independence,
GUARDIAN, May 6, 2011, 14:27 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/06/snp-electionvictory-scottish-independence.
4. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
5. Geraldine Baum, Belgium Fracturing Along Linguistic Lines, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at
A.5, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/13/world/fg-belgium13; see also Justin Stares,
Flanders Encouraged to Seek Independence from Belgium by EU’s Growing Power, TELEGRAPH
(London), June 28, 2009, 8:30 AM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/5664644/
Flanders-encouraged-to-seek-independence-from-Belgium-by-EUs-growing-power.html (“The notion
that breaking up a country as insignificant as Belgium could lead to anything more appealing in its
place may seem far-fetched beyond its shores.”).
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sovereignty era” in which the significance of statehood is diminished.6
Why do Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalists seek separation in the
midst of an integrating continent?
The paradox of separatism within the EU implicates “[t]he interrelated
concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and the territorial integrity of
states” that “form a Gordian knot at the core of public international law.”7
Like their counterparts throughout the world, Flemish, Scottish, and
Catalan nationalists often couch their calls for independence in the
language of the right to self-determination.8
Yet although selfdetermination has become a mainstay of nationalist political rhetoric, it
possesses only limited utility as a legal right. Self-determination exists in
tension with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that form
the foundation of the international system of states. The international
community has sought to resolve this tension by effectively eliminating the
circumstances in which the right to self-determination equates with a right
to secession and independence. Consequently, under current conceptions
of international law, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia do not possess a
right to statehood.
But as notions of a post-sovereignty era suggest, the nature of
statehood has undergone profound changes in recent decades, particularly
in Europe. Those changes inform separatist politics in Europe’s stateless

6. See, e.g., MICHAEL KEATING, PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY: STATELESS NATIONS IN A POSTSOVEREIGNTY ERA 27–28 (2001) (describing “post-sovereignty” as “the end of state monopoly of
ultimate authority”); JANET LAIBLE, SEPARATISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEW EUROPE: PARTY
POLITICS AND THE MEANINGS OF STATEHOOD IN A SUPRANATIONAL CONTEXT 28–32 (2008) (“Postsovereign approaches agree with the proposition that the sovereignty of the modern state has long been
challenged and compromised. Instead of claiming the monopoly on sovereignty, states in the
contemporary global order, and most significantly in the EU, ‘must share their prerogatives with suprastate, sub-state, and trans-state systems.’”).
7. Christopher J. Borgen, Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of
Eurasia’s “Frozen Conflicts,” 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 477, 477 (2007).
8. See, e.g., New-Flemish Alliance, NIEUW-VLAAMSE ALLIANTIE, http://archive.is/ST8EM (last
visited Jan. 21, 2014) (“[T]he N-VA stands for the right of self-determination of peoples, this being a
fundamental principle of international law . . . . According to international law, Flanders meets all
requirements to become a state on its own . . . .”); Fiona Govan, Catalonia Calls Snap Elections in
Independence Drive from Madrid, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 25, 2012, 9:05 PM BST,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9566649/Catalonia-calls-snap-elections-inindependence-drive-from-Madrid.html (quoting Artur Mas, the nationalist leader of Catalonia’s
regional government, as proclaiming that “[t]he time has come to exercise the right to selfdetermination . . . . We want the same instruments that other nations have to preserve our common
identity.”); SNP in Glasgow, GLASGOW SCOT. NAT’L PARTY, http://www.glasgowsnp.org/
SNP_in_Glasgow/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (“The [SNP] has been at the forefront of the campaign for
Scottish self-determination for almost seventy years. The evolution of the SNP has been paralleled by
the political evolution of Scotland herself – from an almost totally unionist country to a nation on the
brink of independence.”).
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nations and add a new dimension to the analysis of their self-determination
claims. The SNP’s old campaign slogan, “Independence in Europe,”9
captures the essence of sub-state nationalist attitudes towards European
integration: Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalists have tethered the
traditional goal of sovereign statehood to the realities of an integrating
Europe in which state sovereignty is constrained.
To be sure, the relationship between European integration and substate nationalism is complex and at times contradictory. While the EU
provides avenues for the articulation and pursuit of nationalist objectives
beyond the borders of the state, it also bolsters the significance of statehood
by limiting full participation in its institutions to member states; while
integration creates certain safety nets that make it easier for stateless
nations to contemplate independence, the European dimension might also
complicate the process of secession. Regardless of these complexities,
however, the EU has become a critical component of sub-state nationalist
aspirations. Accordingly, legal and political factors within the EU⎯most
notably the respective roles of states and regions within the EU’s
institutional structure, the rules governing membership in the EU, and the
broader debates over the future of European integration occasioned by the
“eurozone crisis”⎯have as much to say about the prospects for Flemish,
Scottish, and Catalan nationalism as do the state-centric principles of
international law.
This article explores the meaning of “Independence in Europe” in
light of the current parameters of the right to self-determination, which
remains rooted in notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
the process of European integration, which has given rise to a more
nuanced understanding of sovereignty and statehood. Part I provides
background on Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders, paying particular
attention to the ways in which the nationalist movements in these regions
have been influenced by their unique identities, their acquisition of political
autonomy, and economic disputes with their respective parent states. Part
II addresses the scope of the right to self-determination in international law
and demonstrates that Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia do not possess a
unilateral right to secede. By applying the framework articulated by the
Canadian Supreme Court in its advisory opinion on Quebec’s possible
secession from Canada, however, this part describes how Europe’s stateless
nations could negotiate independence from their parent states. Part III
places Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalism within the context of

9. See LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 105–13 (tracing the origins of the SNP’s pro-Europe ideology
and “Independence in Europe” slogan).
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European integration and explores how the EU both encourages and places
limits on self-determination claims. Finally, Part IV returns to the paradox
of separatism in the midst of integration and suggests how international law
and state practice might evolve to reflect new realities at a time when the
building block of the international system⎯the state⎯is being challenged
both from above and from below.
I. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE’S STATELESS NATIONS: IDENTITY,
AUTONOMY, AND THE ECONOMY
The contours of present-day Catalan, Scottish, and Flemish
nationalism have been shaped by three interrelated factors: identity,
autonomy, and the economy. First, Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders are
paradigmatic examples of stateless nations: they are well-defined territories
with unique historical, cultural, economic, and political identities, and they
have maintained their unique identities despite being incorporated for long
periods of time within larger states.10 Second, consistent with the trend
towards decentralization evident in many Western European states since
the end of the Second World War,11 they have established autonomous
political institutions, which have tended to reinforce their separate
identities and prompt demands for even greater self-rule. Third, the
nationalist movements in these stateless nations have been given impetus
by economic disputes with their respective parent states⎯disputes that
have been exacerbated by the eurozone crisis and that in many respects
mirror the economic dilemmas faced by the EU.
A. Catalonia: Rising Separatist Sentiment
Prior to its gradual incorporation into the nascent Spanish state
following the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469, Catalonia formed
the dominant part of the Crown of Aragon, which controlled a powerful

10. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global Age,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1251, 1254 (2003) (defining “nations without states” as “nations which, in spite of
having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more States . . . maintain a separate
sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular
territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves”); see generally KEATING, supra note 6 (examining
politics in several stateless nations, including Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders).
11. See TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 701–13 (2005) (describing
the postwar process of political decentralization in several Western European states); John Hopkins, The
Future of Sub-National Governments in a Supra-National World – Lessons from the European Union,
38 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 19, 22–23 (2007) (noting the “unexpected rebellion of sub-national
identities” following the Second World War, which “left Western Europe with a variety of sub-national
regional structures”).
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trading empire that stretched throughout the Mediterranean.12 Even at this
early stage, Catalonia exhibited characteristics associated with modern
statehood, such as a common language and well-developed political, legal,
and economic structures.13 As Madrid extended its authority, Catalonia
maintained its own currency, tax system, and distinct culture rooted in the
Catalan language.14 The vestiges of Catalan self-government were not
fully extinguished until the early eighteenth century, after Catalonia backed
the losing Hapsburg side in the War of Spanish Succession.15
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a revival of
Catalan cultural and political awareness, as well as the growth of Catalan
nationalism as an organized political movement.16 This renaissance
coincided with the development of an industrial economy that made
Catalonia more prosperous and advanced than the rest of Spain.17 For a
brief period in the 1930s, Catalonia regained a measure of self-rule.18
Following the Spanish Civil War, however, General Francisco Franco
established a centralized dictatorship that “was determined to put an end
once and for all to the ‘Catalan problem.’”19 What followed was “one of
the darkest periods of Catalan history,” during which Catalans “endured
repression of individual and collective cultural rights, such as the
prohibition of the use of the Catalan language, the public denial of the
Catalan identity and the punishment [of] cultural expression.”20
Catalan identity⎯and the quest for political autonomy⎯reemerged
during the transition to democracy that followed Franco’s death in 1975.21
Article 2 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution proclaimed “the indissoluble
unity of the Spanish Nation” but also “recognize[d] and guarantee[d] the
right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is

12. See generally NORMAN DAVIES, VANISHED KINGDOMS: THE RISE AND FALL OF STATES AND
NATIONS 151–227 (2011) (providing a detailed history of the Crown of Aragon).
13. KENNETH MCROBERTS, CATALONIA: NATION BUILDING WITHOUT A STATE 13 (2001)
(quoting PIERRE VILAR, LA CATALOGNE DANS L’ESPAGNE MODERNE 220 (1962)) (“Between 1250 and
1350, the Catalan principality was perhaps the European country to which it would be the least inexact
or risky to use such seemingly anachronistic terms as political and economic imperialism or ‘nationstate.’”).
14. Id. at 14–16.
15. DAVIES, supra note 12, at 222–23.
16. MCROBERTS, supra note 13, at 16–39.
17. Id. at 16–17.
18. Id. at 33–39.
19. Id. at 40.
20. Josep Desquens, Europe’s Stateless Nations in the Era of Globalization: The Case for
Catalonia’s Secession from Spain, 6 BOLOGNA CTR. J. INT’L AFF. 85, 89 (2003), available at
http://www.jhubc.it/bcjournal/articles/desquens.cfm.
21. MCROBERTS, supra note 13, at 44–48.
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composed.”22 The Constitution provided a framework for self-government
for those regions “with common historic, cultural and economic
characteristics”⎯Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia.23 A Statute
of Autonomy enacted in 1979 established a Catalan regional government,
the Generalitat de Catalunya.24 Ultimately, in an effort to downplay the
uniqueness of its three “historic nationalities,” Spain also extended
autonomous institutions to its other regions.25 As Michael Keating
explains, “Spain’s system of autonomous governments is the result of
contradictory pressures for differentiation, coming from the historic
nationalities, and for uniformity, coming from the central state.”26 Despite
its significant degree of decentralization, Spain has resisted outright
federalization and remains (at least in formal constitutional terms) a unitary
state.
For the most part, Catalan nationalists have been willing to work
within the parameters of this political structure. Catalonia’s largest
political party, Convergència i Unió (CiU), has been a strong advocate of
Catalan autonomy but has typically stopped short of calling for secession.27
In recent years, however, increased tensions between Catalonia and the
Spanish state have precipitated a spike in support for separation. The turn
towards a more robust nationalism can be traced to June 2006, when
Catalans voted in favor of an amended Statute of Autonomy that expanded
the authority of the Generalitat⎯and, most contentiously, defined
Catalonia as a “nation.”28 Spain’s leading conservative political party, the
Partido Popular, challenged the constitutionality of the amended statute,
particularly on the ground that the Constitution recognizes only one,

22. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, § 2, Dec. 29, 1978, translated at La Moncloa, GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA,
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Espana/LeyFundamental/titulo_preliminar.htm (last visited
Jan. 9, 2014).
23. Id. §§ 143–58.
24. Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña (B.O.E. 1979, 30178), translated at Statute of Autonomy
of 1979, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut1979/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
25. See How Much Is Enough?: Devolution Has Been Good for Spain, but It May Have Gone Too
Far, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 2008, at SS8, available at http://www.economist.com/node/12501023 (noting
that the granting of autonomy to all of Spain’s regions is known as café para todos, or “coffee for all”).
26. KEATING, supra note 6, at 116.
27. See MCROBERTS, supra note 13, at 66–72 (describing CiU’s moderate, pro-autonomy
policies); id. at 86–87 (contrasting CiU’s policies with those of Catalonia’s smaller nationalist party,
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), which has often taken a stronger pro-independence line).
28. Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña (B.O.E. 2006, 13087), translated at PARLAMENT DE
CATALUNYA, http://www.parlament-cat.net/porteso/estatut/estatut_angles_100506.pdf (last visited Oct.
9, 2013).
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Spanish, nation.29 In June 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court struck
down several parts of the amended Statute of Autonomy, including those
defining Catalonia as a nation and giving formal preference to the use of
the Catalan language.30
The court’s decision sparked widespread
nationalist demonstrations in Barcelona.31
Indeed, the legal wrangling over the amended Statute of Autonomy
took place against a backdrop of increased nationalist activity. Beginning
in December 2009 and culminating in Barcelona in April 2011, Catalan
nationalists staged a series of non-binding referendums in which the
majority of voters expressed support for secession.32
Meanwhile,
Catalonia’s successful campaign to ban the traditional Spanish pastime of
bullfighting was widely viewed as a nationalist provocation.33
Economic issues have long been a source of friction between
Barcelona and Madrid. Catalonia is one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, but
it does not control its own taxes; instead, Catalonia’s tax revenue goes to
the central government, which then remits what Catalan nationalists argue
is a disproportionately small amount of funds.34 The eurozone crisis has
exacerbated disputes over this taxation arrangement. Prime Minister
Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular government blames Spain’s economic
woes on free-spending regional governments;35 in contrast, Catalonia

29. Gaspar Pericay, The Spanish Constitutional Court Shortens the Current Catalan Statute of
Autonomy, CATALAN NEWS AGENCY (June 29, 2010), http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/
item/the-spanish-constitutional-court-shortens-the-current-catalan-statute-of-autonomy.
30. Id.
31. Gaspar Pericay Coll, Catalonia Answers Back through Colossal Demonstration: ‘We Are a
Nation’, CATALAN NEWS AGENCY (July 11, 2010), http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/
item/catalonia-answers-back-through-a-colossal-demonstration-we-are-a-nation.
32. Giles Tremlett, Catalan Independence Boost after Barcelona Vote, GUARDIAN, Apr. 11,
2011,
13:08
EDT,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/11/catalan-independence-boostbarcelona-vote?cat=world&type=article; Spain’s Catalonia Region in Symbolic Independence Vote,
BBC News, BBC.COM (Dec. 14, 2009, 18:19 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8410730.stm.
33. Tracy Rucinski, Spanish Regions Scrap over Bullfighting, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 2010, 12:53 PM
GMT, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/03/05/uk-spain-bullfighting-idUKTRE62424U201
00305.
34. See Ricard González & Jaume Clotet, Op-Ed., Spanish Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/opinion/a-new-call-for-catalonias-independence.html?emc=tnt&
tntemail1=y (characterizing the financial arrangement between Catalonia and Madrid as “fiscal
looting”); see also Desquens, supra note 20, at 90–91.
35. See Mats Persson, Spain Can’t Even Control Spending in Its Regions – So How Will Brussels
Control Spending in Portugal, Spain, or Italy?, TELEGRAPH (London), May 31, 2012,
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/matspersson/100017577/spain-cant-even-control-spending-in-itsregions-so-how-will-brussels-control-spending-in-portugal-spain-or-italy/ (“Prime Minister Mariano
Rajoy has blamed the regions for Spain’s failure to meet its EU-mandated debt and deficit targets. Over
half of the country’s planned savings for this year – €18bn – are supposed to come from the
comunidades autónomas. This ain’t gonna happen. In fact, Catalonia – Spain’s wealthiest region – has
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attributes its deficit to its inability to control its own finances.36 In the
wake of the nationalist rally in Barcelona on September 11, 2012, Prime
Minister Rajoy rejected Catalan leader Artur Mas’s request for a new tax
revenue distribution plan.37 The Generalitat responded by voting in favor
of holding a referendum on Catalan independence and moved up regional
elections to November 2012 in an effort to capitalize on anticipated
nationalist support.38
Despite CiU’s disappointing showing in the
November elections, nationalists still managed to capture the majority of
seats in the Generalitat.39 In January 2013, the Generalitat adopted a
“Declaration of Sovereignty” proclaiming Catalonia’s right to determine its
political future in a referendum to be held by 2014⎯a move that the
Spanish government has strongly opposed and characterized as
unconstitutional.40
B. Scotland: The Road to the Referendum
If Catalonia holds a referendum on independence, it will likely look to

already asked the central government to help repay €13bn worth of debt, putting further strains on the
country’s public finances.”).
36. See Xavier Vilà Carrera, The Domain of Spain: How Likely is Catalan Independence?,
WORLD AFF. J., Jan./Feb. 2014, at 80 (“The pro-independence forces claim that Catalonia’s fiscal
imbalance with Spain’s national budget amounts to $20 billion (US dollars) per year, according to
figures from the Catalan government’s finance minister. This office claims that Catalonia—origin of a
quarter of Spain’s exports—suffers an insufficient investment and financial disadvantage since it
generates nineteen percent of Spain’s GDP and receives back eleven percent in expenditure from the
central government.”).
37. Rafael Minder, Spain’s Leader Fails to Reach Deal With Catalonia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/world/europe/spains-prime-minister-fails-to-reach-revenuedeal-with-catalonia.html.
38. Madrid and Catalonia Clash over Independence Referendum, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2012, 2:50
PM EDT, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-spain-catalonia-idUSBRE88Q1JE
20120927.
39. Catalonia’s Election: Trouble Ahead, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, at 58, available at
www.economist.com/news/europe/21567405-ruling-party-does-badly-heading-more-clashes-madridtrouble-ahead/print.
40. PARLAMENT DE CATALUNYA [PARLIAMENT OF CATALONIA], DECLARACÍO DE SOBIRANIA I
DEL DRET A DECIDIR DEL POBLE DE CATALUNYA [DECLARATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OF THE RIGHT
TO DECIDE OF THE PEOPLE OF CATALONIA] (Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF
SOVEREIGNTY], available at http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2013/01/23/20/58/033ae0d1-338c45d0-badf-dfdfbe4b0ede.pdf, translated at GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www10.gencat.cat/
gencat/binaris/declaration_of_sovereignty_tcm34-239795.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2014); see also Gareth
Platt & Olivia Fandino, Spain: Government to Challenge Catalonia Independence Declaration in
Court, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:53 PM GMT), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/441159/
20130301/spain-barcelona-catalonia.htm; Guy Hedgecoe, Spanish Court Suspends Catalonia’s
Declaration of Sovereignty, IRISH TIMES, May 9, 2013, at 12 (reporting that Spain’s Constitutional
Court suspended the Declaration of Sovereignty pending its decision on the Spanish government
challenge to the Declaration’s constitutionality).
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Scotland as a guide. Scotland’s existence as an independent state ended in
1707, when the Scottish parliament entered into the Treaty of Union with
England.41 The Treaty dissolved the Scottish parliament and transferred
ultimate political authority to London.42 One Scottish parliamentarian of
the time lamented that the day on which the Treaty was put to a vote in the
Scottish parliament was “the last day Scotland was Scotland.”43 But
Scotland “entered the [United Kingdom] with a distinct institutional
trajectory of its own,” and following the union it retained a robust civil
society, including its own legal and educational systems, social welfare
programs, and established (Presbyterian) church.44 Scots also made
significant contributions to the British Empire, which “did not dilute the
sense of Scottish identity but strengthened it by powerfully reinforcing the
sense of national esteem and demonstrating that the Scots were equal
partners in the great imperial mission.”45
Although Scottish culture and identity flourished in the United
Kingdom and the Empire, Scottish nationalism as a political force largely
lay dormant until the 1960s, when the SNP surprised the British
establishment by winning a parliamentary by-election.46 The discovery of
oil in the North Sea in 1970 led many nationalists to argue for greater
Scottish control over its own resources and revenues and to claim that
Scotland could survive economically as an independent state.47 Diverting
the flow of North Sea oil revenues from London to Edinburgh remains a
central plank in the SNP’s economic platform.48
During the 1970s, in an effort to co-opt Scottish national sentiment
and maintain its position as the dominant political party in Scotland, the
Labour Party announced plans for the devolution of political authority to
Scottish institutions, but its proposal failed to obtain a sufficient number of
votes in a 1979 referendum.49 The issue of devolution was shelved during
41. See T.M. DEVINE, THE SCOTTISH NATION: A HISTORY: 1700–2000, at 3–30 (1999)
(describing events in Scotland leading up to and following the Treaty of Union).
42. Id. at 6–16.
43. TOM NAIRN, AFTER BRITAIN: NEW LABOUR AND THE RETURN OF SCOTLAND 94 (2000).
44. SCOTT L. GREER, NATIONALISM AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: THE POLITICS OF AUTONOMY IN
SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA 44 (2007).
45. DEVINE, supra note 41, at 289–90.
46. Id. at 574.
47. Id. at 585–86.
48. See, e.g., THE SCOTTISH GOV’T, YOUR SCOTLAND, YOUR VOICE: A NATIONAL
CONVERSATION 38 (2009), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/293639/0090721
.pdf [hereinafter YOUR SCOTLAND, YOUR VOICE] (noting that North Sea oil revenues currently go to the
British government and proposing that, after independence, Scotland could invest those revenues in a
sovereign wealth fund that would “creat[e] a permanent source of revenue”).
49. GREER, supra note 44, at 50–51, 62.
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the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Conservative Party governed the
United Kingdom. The Conservatives followed an unabashedly pro-Union
line, which alienated many Scottish institutions accustomed to being
afforded a wide berth by London and in turn increased Scottish support for
autonomy.50
When the Labour Party returned to power under Tony Blair in 1997, it
promised devolution of powers throughout the United Kingdom, in part to
“‘lance the boil’ of independence.”51 In 1998, the Labour government
introduced the Scotland Act, which provided for the creation of a local
Scottish parliament.52 In contrast to the failed devolution referendum of
1979, Scottish voters enthusiastically backed the Scotland Act, and in 1999
the first Scottish Parliament since 1707 met in Edinburgh.53 Ultimately, the
Scotland Act formed part of a broader pattern of devolution that also
resulted in the establishment of a Welsh Assembly and, under the terms of
the Good Friday Agreement, a power-sharing government composed of
unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland.54
Although the Labour Party initially controlled the devolved Scottish
Parliament, in the 2007 elections the SNP cut deeply into Labour’s
majority, and the SNP’s leader, Alex Salmond, became First Minister in an
SNP-led minority government.55 The SNP’s decisive May 2011 victory
pushed independence to the forefront of Scotland’s political agenda. On
January 25, 2012, the birthday of the Scottish national poet Robert Burns,
Salmond announced plans to hold a referendum on Scottish independence
in the autumn of 2014, which would coincide with the 700th anniversary of
the victory of Scottish forces over English invaders at the Battle of
Bannockburn.56 The government of Prime Minister David Cameron came

50. Id. at 69–88 (“Conservative governments of these years pursued policies and policymaking
strategies that eroded Scottish organizations’ autonomy and stability. The organizations’ backlash took
the form of support for devolution.”).
51. James Macintyre, Op-Ed., From Devolution to Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/opinion/from-devolution-to-independence.html?pagewanted=1
&_r=0&ref=opinion.
52. Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46.
53. DEVINE, supra note 41, at 616–17.
54. Devolution of Powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/devolution-of-powers-to-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland (last updated Feb.
18, 2013).
55. Neal Ascherson, Op-Ed., Will Scotland Go Its Own Way?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/opinion/independence-for-scotland.html.
56. John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Scots Begin Bid for Vote on Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/world/europe/scots-launch-bid-for-vote-onindependence.html.
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out forcefully in opposition to Scottish independence.57 Nonetheless, in the
Edinburgh Agreement reached on October 15, 2012, the British
government granted the Scottish Parliament authority to hold a referendum,
and the two governments agreed to the ground rules for the referendum
process.58
C. Flanders: Breaking Up the Most Successful Failed State of All Time
In 2008, a German newspaper dubbed Belgium “the most successful
‘failed state’ of all time.”59 This comment captures the contradiction at the
heart of Belgian life: despite the deep divisions between its Dutch- and
French-speaking communities, Belgium has remained peaceful and
prosperous. The recent rise in support for Flemish separatism, however,
has exposed the fragility of the Belgian political system and has
increasingly led to talk of a possible breakup.
Unlike Scotland and Catalonia, Flanders has no history of
independence. Instead, it coalesced as an identifiable territorial and
political unit following the creation of the Belgian state.60 Belgium itself is
a product of secession: in 1830, at the instigation of the local Frenchspeaking bourgeoisie and with the support of the Great Powers, the Belgian
provinces declared independence from the Netherlands, and a German
nobleman, Leopold of Saxe Coburg Gotha, was installed as the first King
of the Belgians.61
Prior to 1830, “there was no shared sense of ‘Belgian’ identity, no

57. See John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Cameron Details Arguments against Scottish
Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/europe/cameronspeech-scotland-independence-referendum.html (quoting Cameron as asserting: “I am one hundred
percent clear that I will fight with everything I have to keep our United Kingdom together”).
58. Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a
Referendum on Independence for Scotland, Oct. 15, 2012, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Resource/0040/00404789.pdf [hereinafter Edinburgh Agreement].
59. Siobhán Dowling, The World from Berlin: ‘Belgium is the World’s Most Successful Failed
State,’ Speigel Online International, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 16, 2008, 12:31 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,566201,00.html (quoting an article from the German
newspaper Die Tageszeitung).
60. See KRIS DESCHOUWER, THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: GOVERNING A DIVIDED SOCIETY 42–43
(2009) (explaining that, unlike in Spain or the United Kingdom, “the Belgian regions and communities
did not exist before Belgium was created”). The Flemish provinces were distinguishable, however,
from neighboring areas of the Low Countries due to their use of the Dutch language (which separated
them from the French-speaking Catholic areas to the south) and adherence to Catholicism (which
differentiated them from the Protestant Dutch-speaking areas to the north). Id. at 18–19. Moreover,
Flanders lay at the heart of the Kingdom of Burgundy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
DAVIES, supra note 12, at 128–43.
61. Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No Reconciliation:
The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 156–57 (Winter 2009).
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sense of a single people seeking nationhood.”62 Even after independence,
the fostering of a shared identity often proved difficult, in large part
because the new state straddled a linguistic fault line separating the Dutchspeaking north (Flanders) from the French-speaking south (Wallonia).63
From the outset, the francophone minority dominated Belgium. French
was the language of politics, commerce, and culture, and the capital,
Brussels, gradually became a predominantly French-speaking city despite
being located in Flanders.64 The mines and factories of Wallonia drove the
economy and concentrated wealth in the south, while Flanders remained
poor and agricultural.65 To the francophone elite, Dutch was a language
“for domestics and animals,”66 and the Flemish themselves were
“uneducated, backward peasants, suitable to do manual labor but little
else.”67
The roots of modern Flemish nationalism can be traced to the
“Flemish Movement,” which during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries sought greater equality in the area of language rights.68 Under
pressure from the movement, the Belgian government gradually extended
the official use of Dutch in legal, educational, and administrative matters.69
Yet “the national language policy essentially became one of dual
monolingualism, based on the principle of territorial location, not
bilingualism, with language rights attaching to individuals.”70 In other
words, language rights were determined by where an individual lived rather
than by the individual’s native tongue.71 By 1963, Belgium’s “language
border,” separating Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking
Wallonia, had become fixed.72

62. Id. at 157.
63. This fault line was historically entrenched. “Julius Caesar’s Gallica Belgica lay athwart the
line that was to separate Gallo-Roman territories from the Franks and mark the boundary thenceforth
demarcating Latinate, French-dominated Europe from the Germanic north.” JUDT, supra note 11, at
708 n.1.
64. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 157–59, 169.
65. Id. at 158.
66. Ian Buruma, Le Divorce, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2011, at 36.
67. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 158.
68. Id. at 159–60.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 160.
71. In a landmark decision, the European Court of Human Rights largely upheld Belgian
legislation providing for monolingual educational systems based on territory. Case “Relating to Certain
Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium,” 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1968).
72. DESCHOUWER, supra note 60, at 46. Prior to 1963, the regional borders had been defined by
a linguistic census conducted every ten years and thus had been subject to occasional modifications. Id.
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Meanwhile, following the Second World War, the economic
circumstances of the Flemish and Walloons were dramatically reversed:
Flanders developed a modern economy and emerged as one of the
wealthiest regions in Europe, while Wallonia, faced with decreased mining
productivity and the shuttering of factories, suffered a sharp post-industrial
decline.73 Wallonia became dependent on subsidies from the national
government, which the newly prosperous Flemish often viewed as being
unfairly paid out of their taxes.74 Financial transfers from Flanders to
Wallonia remain a critical source of Flemish nationalist grievance: “the
average Flemish person on the street resents the idea of substantial
subsidies from Flanders to the Walloon region.”75
The economic rise of Flanders was accompanied by sweeping changes
to the Belgian political system. Beginning in 1970, a series of
constitutional reforms reflecting the territorial-linguistic divide transformed
Belgium from a highly centralized unitary state into a highly decentralized
federal state.76 Broadly, the constitutional reforms established three
regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital) and three “language
communities” (Dutch, French, and German), each with their own
parliaments and areas of competency.77 Flanders and Wallonia are
officially monolingual, while Brussels-Capital is officially bilingual,
although the majority of its population speaks French.78 Only those
residual powers not explicitly reserved for the regions or language
communities belong to the federal government.79 Belgium is not a “coming
together” federation like the United States or Switzerland, where smaller

at 44.
73. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 161.
74. See JUDT, supra note 11, at 708 (“Most of the former miners, steel-workers and their families
in [Wallonia] now depended upon a welfare system administered from the country’s bi-lingual capital
and paid for⎯as it seemed to Flemish nationalists⎯out of the taxes of gainfully employed
northerners.”).
75. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 171–72; see also JUDT, supra note 11, at 710
(describing Flemish nationalism as the product of “two self-ascribed identities⎯repressed linguistic
minority and frustrated economic dynamo”).
76. DESCHOUWER, supra note 60, at 48–54. In 1993, Article I of the Belgian Constitution was
amended to declare Belgium a federal state composed of three regions and three language communities.
Id. at 41.
77. Id. at 48–54. In addition to its Dutch- and French-speaking communities, Belgium has a
small German-speaking population along its eastern border. See Richard Connor, Belgium’s GermanSpeaking Cantons Ponder Their Position, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.dw.de/
belgiums-german-speaking-cantons-ponder-their-position/a-15890523 (describing the political position
of German-speaking Belgians in the midst of the Flemish-Walloon divide).
78. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 169 & n.98.
79. DESCHOUWER, supra note 60, at 56.
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political entities united for a common purpose;80 rather, it might best be
described as a “falling apart” federation, where the federal components
were created specifically to reflect differences and the centrifugal forces of
federalism have hollowed out the national core.
To a far greater extent than either Spain or the United Kingdom,
Belgium exhibits the hallmarks of an ethnic conflict. The Flemish and
Walloons speak different languages, live in different areas, attend different
schools, consume different media, and largely are governed by different
institutions.81 Indeed, they may no longer even vote for the same political
parties: between 1968 and 1978, the three major parties (the Christian
Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals) each splintered into French- and
Dutch-speaking factions that only contest elections within their respective
territorial and linguistic spheres.82 Where the two communities do come
into regular contact, such as in the increasingly francophone Flemish
suburbs of Brussels, relationships are strained by disputes over language
use and voting rights.83
80. Id. at 42.
81. See Baum, supra note 5 (“After decades of snubs and bitter grudges, the two halves of
Belgium have separate languages, political parties, schools and media. Some claim that even the birds
of Flanders and Wallonia sing in different languages.”); Christopher Caldwell, Belgium Waffles: Two
Nations, After All?, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 21, 2009, at 24, 24, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/327fxssq.asp (“French speakers
and Dutch speakers inhabit different cultural universes. Most people have never heard of the major
politicians, the major actresses, and sometimes even the major athletes on the other side of a country
that is smaller than Maryland.”); Doug Saunders, For Bitterly Divided Belgium, the Future Looks Grim,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 26, 2007, at A3 (“[Belgium] has always been divided into twin
solitudes of extraordinary isolation: The French-speaking Walloon minority and Dutch-speaking
Flemish majority have long existed in isolated worlds. With no shared national media, few shared
institutions and no form of bilingualism, forming governments has never been easy.”).
82. JUDT, supra note 11, at 712.
83. In particular, Flemish nationalists have opposed rules entitling francophones in many Brussels
suburbs to municipal services in French, even though Flanders is otherwise an exclusively Dutchspeaking region, and have objected to the existence of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (“BHV”) electoral
district, in which French-speakers, despite living in Flanders, may vote for francophone political parties
from the Brussels-Capital region. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 169–71. Consequently, the
Brussels suburbs have become flashpoints for ethno-linguistic tension. See Steven Erlanger, Seams of
Belgium’s Quilt Threaten to Burst, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/world/europe/14belgium.html (describing the efforts of Flemish
nationalist politicians in the Brussels suburb of Liedekerke to maintain the “Flemish nature” of the town
in the face of an influx of French-speakers); Michael Kimmelman, With Flemish Nationalism on the
Rise, Belgium Teeters on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at E1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/arts/04abro.html (describing linguistic tensions in the Brussels
bedroom community of Linkebeek); Delphine Schrank, Belgians Limp Along, Hobbled by Old
Language Barriers, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/29/AR2008012903286.html (noting the passage of regulations in the
suburb of Zaventem restricting the sale of public land to those who speak Dutch or who demonstrate a
willingness to learn it); Thousands of Flemish Separatists Stage March near Brussels, NAHARNET
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Belgium’s recent national elections put its dysfunctional political
culture on full display. Following the June 2007 elections, calls for greater
Flemish self-rule triggered political deadlock that took over nine months to
resolve.84 The N-VA’s unexpected success in the June 2010 elections
precipitated an even longer crisis: in February 2011, Belgium set a record
for the most number of days without a functioning national government,
surpassing the previous record set by war-torn Iraq.85 Both the 2007 and
2010 national elections caused many observers to question whether
Belgium would survive as a state.86
Belgium only managed to form a coalition government in December
2011 and then only in the face of pressures stemming from the economic
crisis, which had led to a downgrade of Belgium’s credit rating.87 Yet even
this pact has failed to quell talk of a Belgian breakup. To form the
coalition, Belgium’s political parties agreed to a further devolution of
powers to the regional governments.88 Still, the N-VA refused to join the
governing coalition and, as the leading opposition party, remains
committed to eventual Flemish independence. Flemish regional elections
in October 2012 confirmed the N-VA’s position as the largest party in
Flanders, and its leader, Bart De Wever, was elected mayor of Antwerp.89
De Wever envisions the gradual breakup of the Belgian state through the
continued transfer of powers to the regions; his goal is that “Belgium will
be snuffed out slowly . . . like a candle, barely noticed by anyone.”90

(Sept. 18, 2011, 14:26), http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/15284 (reporting on a provocative march
by hard-line Flemish separatists through the largely francophone town of Lindebeek). Tensions over
the BHV electoral district were finally eased in July 2012, when the government agreed to split the
constituency in two. Row over Key Belgium Constituency Resolved, EURONEWS (July 14, 2012, 2:03
CET), http://www.euronews.com/2012/07/14/row-over-key-belgium-constituency-resolved/.
84. Stephen Castle, Belgium Forms Coalition Government, Ending Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/world/europe/21belgium.html.
85. Leo Cendrowicz, Belgian Waffling: Who Needs Government, Anyway?, TIME, Feb. 21, 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052843,00.html.
86. Frequently, these observers compared the relationship between Flanders and Wallonia to an
unhappy marriage and the potential breakup of Belgium to a divorce. For an extended use of the
divorce metaphor, which serves as a concise overview of the Flemish-Walloon conflict, see Mnookin &
Verbeke, supra note 61, at 154–56. See also Caldwell, supra note 81 (“But the marriage of Flanders
and Wallonia, never a love match, has in recent decades entered a thrown-crockery phase.”).
87. Chrisafis, supra note 2.
88. Stanley Pignal, Belgium Deal Paves Way for New Government, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011,
8:59 PM, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58abb49c-f41f-11e0-8694-00144feab49a.html.
89. Belgian Flemish Separatists Make Gains at Polls, BBC News, BBC.COM (Oct. 15, 2012,
10:35 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19943890.
90. Buruma, supra note 66, at 36.
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II. SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Of course, the breakup of Belgium⎯or the independence of Scotland
or Catalonia⎯would hardly go unnoticed by the international community.
Secession strikes at the twin pillars of the Westphalian state system:
sovereignty and territorial integrity.91 A successful secession shrinks the
territorial reach of the former parent state’s sovereign authority and
establishes a new sovereign in its place.92 At its most extreme, one or more
successful secessions might trigger the dissolution (i.e., the legal
extinction) of the former parent state, as was the case with Yugoslavia in
the 1990s.93 The Yugoslav example also points to another disruptive
characteristic of secession: secessionist disputes often involve armed
conflict and human rights abuses that pose a threat to international
security.94
International law is frequently described as taking a neutral stance
towards secession; acts of secession are evaluated under domestic law,
while international law is only concerned with regulating secession’s
consequences.95 Nonetheless, secession is clearly disfavored. Although

91. See Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty
Waiver”⎯Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 372–82 (2005) (providing an overview of the impact of the
1648 Peace of Westphalia on the modern concept of the sovereign state); Daniel Philpott, Religious
Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 981, 983 (2004)
(characterizing the Westphalian state as “Janus-faced, its government staring both inward at its subjects,
over which it had supreme authority, and outward beyond the state’s borders, where no rival authority
was entitled to force a change in the governance of its inhabitants”).
92. See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT’L L. 177, 178 (1991) (“Secessionist claims involve, first and foremost, disputed claims to
territory.”).
93. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 390–91 (2d ed.
2006). For a further consideration of issues pertaining to continuity and extinction, see infra Part III.B.
94. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist
Claims, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 62–77 (1998) (discussing the origins of the violent breakup of
Yugoslavia and the international community’s response); see also Aleksandar Pavković, By the Force
of Arms: Violence and Morality in Secessionist Conflict, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PHENOMENON: FROM AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR TO CONTEMPORARY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS 259, 259–
76 (Don H. Doyle ed., 2010) (examining whether the use of force to achieve or prevent secession is
morally justifiable).
95. See CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 390 (“The position is that secession is neither legal nor
illegal in international law, but a legally neutral act the consequences of which are regulated
internationally.”); Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great
Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 1, 8 (2009) (“[O]ne also cannot say that international law makes secession illegal. If anything,
international law is largely silent regarding secession, and attempted secessions are, first and foremost,
assessed under domestic law.”).
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international law recognizes a right to self-determination, such a right, if
applied broadly to offer the possibility of statehood to the world’s myriad
potential claimants, would result in “the radical undermining of State
sovereignty and a dramatic reshaping of the present framework of the
world community.”96 Application of the right to self-determination
therefore has been “selective and limited in many respects.”97 In fact, in the
post-colonial era, it would appear that the right to self-determination never
amounts to a unilateral right to secede.
A. Unilateral Secession: Limits on the Right to Self-Determination
The modern concept of self-determination has its origins in U.S.
President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points and similar
pronouncements following the First World War.98 Wilson’s vision of selfdetermination was expansive and idealistic: he argued that “well-defined
national elements” should be given “the utmost satisfaction that can be
accorded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of
discord or antagonism.”99 The potential perils of this vision were apparent
from the outset. Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, recognized
that given the innumerable “national elements” in the world and the
impossibility of providing each one with its own state, self-determination
would “raise hopes which can never be realized.”100 Moreover, although
the victorious Allies were happy to dismantle the defeated Central Powers
at Versailles, they were far less willing to extend self-determination to the
national minorities within their own borders or, even more unthinkably, to
their colonial subjects.
Thus, as Antonio Cassese explains, “in the era after the First World
War self-determination, although in vogue as a political postulate and a
rhetorical slogan . . . was not a part of the body of international legal
norms.”101 In 1920 and 1921, the League of Nations tasked two expert
commissions with determining the status of the Aaland Islands, which were

96. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 317 (1998).
97. Id.
98. Although the Fourteen Points did not explicitly mention self-determination, they addressed
specific territorial settlements that proposed to carve new states out of the defeated German, AustroHungarian, and Ottoman empires. For the text of the Fourteen Points, see MARGARET MACMILLAN,
PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 495–96 (2003).
99. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 28 (rev. ed. 1996).
100. MACMILLAN, supra note 98, at 11. Wilson ultimately came to the same conclusion: “When I
gave utterance to those words [that ‘all nations had a right to self-determination’], I said them without
the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day.” Id. at 12.
101. CASSESE, supra note 96, at 27.
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part of Finland but whose population was of Swedish descent, spoke
Swedish, and wished to separate from Finland and unite with Sweden.102
The commissions rejected the notion of self-determination in favor of
maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states.
The first
commission, the Committee of Jurists, declared that “Positive International
Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression
of a wish.”103 According to the second commission, the Commission of
Rapporteurs, to recognize such a right “would be to destroy order and
stability within states and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it
would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as
a territorial and political unity.”104 Rather than allow the Aaland Islands to
separate from Finland and unite with Sweden, the League of Nations
directed Finland to implement certain linguistic and educational measures
to protect the Aaland Islanders’ cultural rights within the Finnish state.105
The legal status of self-determination shifted when it was referenced
prominently in several foundational United Nations (UN) documents
following the Second World War. Article I of the UN Charter identified
the development of “friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” as one of
the UN’s primary purposes.106 Similarly, Common Article I of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) declared that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”107 “The concept
of self-determination definitively moved from an aspirational ideal to a
recognized right” by means of its inclusion in the ICCPR and ICESCR.108

102. HANNUM, supra note 99, at 370−71.
103. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920).
104. The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by
the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.7 21/68/106, at 27 (1921) [hereinafter
Aaland Islands Report].
105. Minutes of the Seventeenth Session of the Council, June 27th, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J.
701–02 (1921).
106. U.N. Charter, art. 1, para. 2. The same language also appears in Article 55 of the UN Charter.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, para. 1,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
108. Borgen, supra note 95, at 7.
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Yet despite its gradual acceptance as a legal right, self-determination
has continued to suffer from a fundamental problem: nobody can agree on
exactly what it means. Separatists throughout the world have taken a
broad, essentially Wilsonian view of self-determination in an attempt to
provide legal support for their claims; in the political realm, selfdetermination has become “a shibboleth that all pronounce to identify
themselves with the virtuous.”109 But international law is, first and
foremost, a set of rules made by and for states, and states unsurprisingly
have been reluctant to condone a right that would justify their own
dismemberment.110
In the decades following the adoption of the UN Charter, selfdetermination became almost exclusively associated with the process of
decolonization. Indeed, self-determination only inarguably amounts to a
right to “external self-determination”⎯i.e., a right to independent
statehood⎯when applied to overseas (or “saltwater”) colonies, such as
those of the former European empires in Africa and Asia.111 The UN
General Assembly first proclaimed the right of colonies to external selfdetermination in its 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples,112 and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) subsequently held that the right to external self-determination in the
colonial context has achieved the status of customary international law.113
The granting of external self-determination to saltwater colonies was
consistent with the preservation of the Westphalian state system: with few
109. HANNUM, supra note 99, at 49 (quoting Vernon Van Dyke, Self-Determination and Minority
Rights, 13 INT’L STUD. Q. 223, 223 (1969)).
110. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“[I]t is the principle of national unity that has been almost universally
followed by the international community—which, after all, is composed of states whose interest is to
maintain themselves.”).
111. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age,
32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 272–73 (1996). For a thorough discussion of the right to self-determination as
applied to colonial territories, see CASSESE, supra note 96, at 71–89.
112. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/4684
(Vol. I), at 66 (Dec. 14, 1960) (affirming that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination” and
“solemnly proclaim[ing] the necessity of bringing a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all
its forms and manifestations”).
113. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 110 (Oct. 16) (separate opinion of
Judge Petrén) (“Inspired by a series of resolutions of the General Assembly . . . a veritable law of
decolonization is in the course of taking shape. It derives essentially from the principle of selfdetermination.”); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, ¶ 52 (June 21) (“[T]he subsequent development of international law in regard to non-selfgoverning territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of selfdetermination applicable to all of them.”); see also East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J.
90, at ¶ 31 (June 30) (characterizing East Timor as a “non-self-governing territory,” which therefore
possesses a right to external self-determination).
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exceptions, overseas colonies were not considered integral parts of the
European states that governed them, and their loss, however painful,
therefore did not threaten the sovereignty or alter the borders of the parent
state.114
There is little support for the proposition that a right to external selfdetermination exists beyond the colonial context. Even the former
colonies, having achieved independence under the banner of selfdetermination, promptly rejected the notion that the right might be used to
adjust their own borders.115 At most, only three non-colonial territories in
the UN Charter era⎯Bangladesh, Eritrea, and most recently
Kosovo⎯have successfully seceded without their former parent states’
consent.116 All three involved unique circumstances that arguably limit
their precedential value.117 For example, in recognizing Kosovo’s 2008
114. For example, France’s withdrawal from Vietnam was undoubtedly violent and politically
difficult. See, e.g., MICHAEL BURLEIGH, SMALL WARS, FARAWAY PLACES: GLOBAL INSURRECTION
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 211–43 (2013) (recounting the end of French colonialism
in Vietnam, which culminated in the French military’s humiliating defeat by Viet Minh forces at Dien
Bien Phu in 1954). But Vietnam did not implicate the same issues of sovereignty and territorial
integrity as Algeria, which had long been considered an integral part of France. See id. at 323 (“The
French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, fresh from liquidating the French Empire in Indochina, declared
that Algeria was different. ‘The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic,’ he said.
‘Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession.’”). Indeed, the
“Algerian Question” (i.e., whether and how Algeria and its Muslim majority could be made a full and
equal part of the French state) was a constant source of tension in French politics, and Algeria’s bloody
war of independence (1954–62) brought down France’s Fourth Republic, precipitated an open revolt by
portions of the French military, and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. See IAN S. LUSTICK,
UNSETTLED STATES, DISPUTED LANDS: BRITAIN AND IRELAND, FRANCE AND ALGERIA, ISRAEL AND
THE WEST BANK-GAZA 81−120, 239−301 (1993) (examining the difficulties that France faced in
extricating itself from Algeria due to Algeria’s integration with the French state).
115. See, e.g., Organization of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among African States,
AGH/Res. 16(I) (July 21, 1964) (stating “that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor
of dissention” and committing its member states to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of
national independence”).
116. Borgen, supra note 95, at 9−10. All other successful non-colonial secessions since 1945 were
either achieved with the parent state’s consent (e.g., Senegal, Singapore, and the Baltic States) or were
the result of the dissolution of the parent state (e.g., the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia).
CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 416. The most recent example of secession with the parent state’s
consent is South Sudan’s separation from Sudan in July 2011, pursuant to a peace agreement brokered
with assistance from the United States. Jeffrey Gettleman, South Sudan, the Newest Nation, Is Full of
Hope and Problems, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/world/africa/
08sudan.html?_r=0.
117. Bangladesh achieved independence from Pakistan due largely to the Indian Army’s
intervention on behalf of Bangladeshi separatists, which produced a fait accompli on the ground that the
international community (including Pakistan) eventually accepted. CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at
415−16; HANNUM, supra note 99, at 46 (arguing that Bangladesh’s successful secession “was due more
to the Indian army than to the precepts of international law”). Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia
resulted from the overthrow of Ethiopia’s military regime and the installation of a Transitional
Government that accepted Eritrean independence. Borgen, supra note 95, at 10 n.28. This leads James
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declaration of independence from Serbia, numerous states, including the
United States, characterized Kosovar independence as the sui generis result
of a unique set of circumstances, specifically Serbia’s human rights abuses
in Kosovo during the 1990s and the international community’s subsequent
military intervention and administration of the province.118 By contrast, the
vast majority of attempted non-colonial secessions have failed.119
The most common argument in favor of a right to external selfdetermination outside of the colonial context is that international law
should condone “remedial secession” as a last resort where a group within
the territory of an existing state is denied basic democratic freedoms and is
subjected to severe human rights abuses.120 The concept of remedial
secession finds support in the League of Nations reports on the Aaland
Islands121 and, more recently, in the UN General Assembly’s 1970
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States.122 But remedial secession is far from accepted by the international
community. Kosovo, whose population suffered human rights abuses at
the hands of the Serbian state, was perhaps the clearest recent example of a
situation in which a right to remedial secession would apply. Nonetheless,
in its 2010 advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s secession from
Serbia, the ICJ sidestepped the thorny issue of remedial secession
altogether, choosing instead to confine itself to the narrower question of

Crawford, for one, to classify Eritrea as an example of non-colonial secession achieved with the consent
of the parent state. CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 415−16.
118. See, e.g., Condoleeza Rice, Sec’y of State, United States, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as
Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/
100973.htm (stating that “Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the world
today”). Unlike the secessions of Bangladesh and Eritrea, which have gained universal acceptance,
Kosovo’s secession remains disputed, with many states, including Serbia and Russia, refusing to
recognize its independence. For a list of countries that have recognized Kosovo as an independent
state, see KOS. THANKS YOU, http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
119. See CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 403−15 (examining unsuccessful secession attempts in the
Faroe Islands, Katanga, Biafra, Republika Srpska, Chechnya, Quebec, and Somaliland).
120. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 331−400 (2007) (presenting a comprehensive argument that
“[i]nternational law should recognize a remedial right to secede” where “secession is a remedy of last
resort against serious injustices”).
121. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 104, at 28 (“The separation of a minority from the State of
which it forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply
just and effective guarantees.”).
122. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8082, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970) (protecting the territorial integrity of those states “possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour,” thereby suggesting that states that fail to meet this standard might forfeit their right to
territorial integrity).
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whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence violated international
law.123 Accordingly, while acknowledging the “radically different views”
of whether a right to remedial secession exists, the court determined that “it
is not necessary to resolve these questions in the present case.”124 By
avoiding the issue, the ICJ’s opinion cast doubt on the viability of noncolonial external self-determination claims.
B. Negotiated Secession: Lessons from Quebec
Thus, where the people claiming a right to self-determination resides
within the borders of an existing state, the most that the right can be said to
guarantee is “internal self-determination,” which may be understood as
basic human and democratic rights coupled with certain minority rights that
are designed to recognize and protect the people’s culture and identity.
This concept was at the heart of the League of Nations’ resolution of the
Aaland Islands issue.125 More recently, in 1998⎯amidst ongoing debates
over the possible secession of Quebec from Canada and following
Quebecois separatists’ narrow defeat in a 1995 referendum on
independence126⎯the Canadian Supreme Court reaffirmed international
law’s preference for internal self-determination.
In Reference re Secession of Quebec, an advisory opinion issued at the
request of the Canadian government, the court examined whether Quebec
possessed a unilateral right to secede under either domestic or international
law.127 After finding that Canadian domestic law did not support a right to
unilateral secession,128 the court explained that under international law, “the
right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal
self-determination⎯a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and

123. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 83 (July 22). The question referred to the court by the
General Assembly was: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” Id. ¶ 1. The ICJ found,
unsurprisingly, that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence. Id. ¶ 84.
124. Id. ¶¶ 82−83.
125. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
126. For background and analysis of Quebecois nationalism and Quebec’s 1995 referendum, see
William J. Dodge, Succeeding in Seceding?: Internationalizing the Quebec Secession Reference under
NAFTA, 34 TEX. J. INT’L L. 287, 287−96 (1999). For an in-depth consideration of the possible contours
and consequences of Quebec’s secession, see generally ROBERT A. YOUNG, THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC
AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA (rev. and expanded ed. 1998).
127. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 2. The Canadian government also posed a third question: whether, in
the event of a conflict of authorities on the legality of Quebec’s secession, domestic or international law
would take precedence. Id. Because the court held that both domestic and international law denied
Quebec a unilateral right to secede, it did not reach this third question. Id. ¶ 147.
128. Id. ¶¶ 32−108.
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cultural development within the framework of an existing state.”129
According to the court, this reflects the fact that “[t]he international law
principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect
for the territorial integrity of existing states.”130 Relying on its observation
that numerous Quebecois have held prominent positions in the Canadian
government and on an assertion that “[t]he international achievements of
Quebecers in most fields of human endeavour are too numerous to list,” the
court determined that the people of Quebec exercised their right to internal
self-determination through their ability to “freely make political choices
and pursue economic, social and cultural development within Quebec,
across Canada, and throughout the world.”131 Consequently, the court
concluded that even if international law were to support a right to remedial
secession, such a right was “manifestly inapplicable to Quebec under
existing conditions.”132
But the court went one step further, drawing on “the principles of
federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect
for minorities” enshrined in the Canadian Constitution to outline a process
of negotiated secession.133 According to the court, although Canadian
domestic law does not condone unilateral secession, the Constitution “is
not a straightjacket”; thus, “a clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear
question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the
secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation
would have to recognize.”134 In other words, the democratically expressed
will of the people of Quebec to secede would oblige the rump Canadian
state to engage with Quebec in negotiations concerning possible separation.
Although the court recognized that “[n]o one suggests that it would be an
easy set of negotiations,” it nonetheless concluded that this process was the
only way to ensure “the ultimate acceptance of the result by the
international community.”135
The court’s discussion of negotiated secession left two fundamental
questions unanswered: what is a “clear majority,” and what constitutes a
“clear question”? Regarding the former, the court obviously envisioned
more than a simple majority of 50% plus one.136 Developments subsequent

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. ¶ 126.
Id. ¶ 127.
Id. ¶¶ 135–36.
Id. ¶ 138.
Id. ¶ 148.
Id. ¶ 150.
Id. ¶¶ 151−52.
Particularly for purposes of this article, it is worth noting that in 2006, based on a proposal
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to the court’s opinion provided guidance on the latter. During Quebec’s
1995 referendum, voters were asked: “Do you agree that Quebec should
become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new
economic and political partnership, within the scope of the Bill Respecting
the Future of Quebec, and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”137
The perceived lack of clarity in this question was a major source of
contention between pro- and anti-independence groups and is often
identified as one of the reasons why the vote was so close.138 In 2000, the
Canadian government passed the Clarity Act, which obliges Canada to
negotiate with Quebec over the terms of a possible separation only
following a referendum that sets forth a stark choice between either full
separation or continued inclusion in the Canadian state.139 Accordingly, the
Clarity Act prohibits any “referendum question that envisages other
possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada.”140
The aim of this provision was to foreclose a referendum on “sovereigntyassociation,” a somewhat nebulous proposal often made by Quebecois
nationalists under which Quebec, though nominally independent, would
retain some form of political and economic partnership with the rest of
Canada.141
Given the many similarities between Quebec and the stateless nations
of Europe,142 the Canadian Supreme Court’s analysis of the right to selfdetermination has important implications for Flanders, Scotland, and
Catalonia. As a threshold matter, as with the Canadian Constitution,
nothing in either the Belgian or Spanish constitutions allows for
secession.143 Indeed, the Spanish Constitution not only expressly affirms
made by the EU, Montenegro held a referendum on separation from Serbia that required a majority of
55% to succeed. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], Republic of Montenegro/Serbia and Montenegro: Referendum 21 May
2006: OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, at 3−4 (Mar. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro/18431.
137. KEATING, supra note 6, at 92 n.18.
138. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 126, at 291.
139. Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26.
140. Id. § 1(4)(b).
141. See KEATING, supra note 6, at 89−90 (explaining that the nationalist Parti Québécois’
proposal for sovereignty-association would provide “for a Canadian common market, the continued use
of the Canadian currency in Quebec, and joint executive and parliamentary institutions between Canada
and Quebec to decide on matters of common interest. There would also be free movement of labour
between Canada and Quebec and dual citizenship would be freely available.”); see also id. at 92
(describing the question posed in the 1995 referendum as “hovering between the sovereignty and
sovereignty-association options”).
142. See generally id. (characterizing Quebec as a stateless nation and analyzing its politics
alongside the stateless nations of Europe).
143. See C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, § 2, Dec. 29, 1978, translated at La Moncloa, GOBIERNO DE
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the existence of a single Spanish nation but also vests exclusive
competence for holding referendums in the national government144 and
arguably authorizes the use of military force to combat any attempt at
secession.145 For its part, the 1707 Treaty of Union does not contemplate
separation but rather proclaims that “the two Kingdoms of England and
Scotland shall . . . for ever after be united into one Kingdom . . . .”146 And
like Quebec, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia are neither saltwater
colonies possessing a right to external self-determination nor victims of
repression such that a right to remedial secession would apply. In short,
Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia are only entitled to⎯and already
possess⎯internal self-determination.
This leaves open the possibility of negotiated secession. The British
government, despite its staunch opposition to Scottish independence, has
thus far demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Scottish nationalists.
In language reminiscent of the Canadian Supreme Court’s advisory
opinion, the Edinburgh Agreement states that a referendum will “deliver a
fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a
result that everyone will respect.”147 Additionally, the Agreement’s
approach to the referendum question reflects the Clarity Act’s view of what
constitutes a “clear question.”
The Agreement specifies that the
referendum will be held on the basis of a single question,148 thereby
thwarting the possibility of including two questions on the referendum
ballot, the first addressing independence and the second gauging support
for “devolution max,” a scenario similar to Quebecois “sovereigntyassociation,” in which Scotland would obtain virtually complete internal
autonomy (including full fiscal powers) but would remain part of the
United Kingdom for external purposes, such as defense and foreign
affairs.149
ESPAÑA,
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Espana/LeyFundamental/titulo_preliminar.htm
(last visited Jan. 9, 2014) (describing the Spanish state as “indivisible”); Mnookin & Verbeke, supra
note 61, at 180 (“Nothing in the Belgian constitution allows secession.”).
144. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, § 149, Dec. 29, 1978, translated at La Moncloa, GOBIERNO DE ESPAÑA,
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Espana/LeyFundamental/titulo_preliminar.htm (last visited
Jan. 9, 2014).
145. See id. § 8(1) (“The mission of the Armed Forces . . . is to guarantee the sovereignty and
independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.”).
146. Union with Scotland Act, 1706, 6 Ann., c. 11; see also KEATING, supra note 6, at 108 (noting
that “[t]here is no constitutional provision for the secession of Scotland” but that British politicians have
largely conceded that “there would be no obstacles placed in Scotland’s way” if it chose to secede).
147. Edinburgh Agreement, supra note 58, pmbl.
148. Id. ¶ 6.
149. Michael Buchanan, Scottish Independence Referendum: What is Devolution Max?, BBC
News, BBC.COM (Feb. 20, 2012, 9:39 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-
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Whereas the British government has demonstrated a willingness to
negotiate with Scottish nationalists over the contours of a referendum, the
Spanish government has thus far refused to engage with Catalan
nationalists in a similar fashion. In the wake of the Catalan government’s
call for an eventual independence referendum, the Spanish government
insisted that such a referendum would be illegal under the Constitution and
vowed to prevent it.150 A serving colonel in the Spanish army even went so
far as to warn that Catalan independence would only occur “[o]ver [his]
dead body and that of many soldiers.”151 It remains to be seen whether
Spain will adhere to its hard-line position in the event that Catalan
nationalists push forward with their plans for a referendum.
Even if referendum-related issues were resolved and a clear majority
vote demonstrated support for independence, Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan
secession would require negotiations between the seceding region and the
parent state. As in Quebec, this would not be an easy set of negotiations.
For example, according to one constitutional scholar, the separation of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 required 30 treaties and 12,000 legal
agreements.152 Similarly, Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan secession would
require agreement not only on the format of the political process leading to
separation but also on thornier issues such as the allocation of resources
and debt.153 And in Belgium, negotiations following a referendum would
almost certainly involve disputes over the fate of Brussels that would likely
determine whether a state entitled to claim the mantle of Belgium’s legal
personality would emerge following Flemish secession.154
Regarding the right to self-determination in Quebec, “international
law has already played (and will be playing) a role as a guiding standard”
insofar as “it has presented the path to be taken regarding decisions about
the destiny of a people, even where no legal entitlement to that people is
granted by any specific legal rule.”155 The same may be said of

17094333.
150. Platt & Fandino, supra note 40; see also Spain Votes to Stop Catalonia Independence
Referendum, REUTERS, Oct. 9, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/09/us-spaincatalonia-idUSBRE8981GO20121009 (describing the Spanish parliament’s rejection of Catalonia’s
proposed independence referendum).
151. Paul Mason, Catalan Leaders Seek Independence Vote, Legal or Not, BBC News, BBC.COM
(Oct. 5, 2012, 12:23 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19847252.
152. Honor Mahony, EU in Uncharted Legal Waters on Scottish Independence,
EUOBSERVER.COM (Jan. 18, 2012, 18:23), http://euobserver.com/843/114896.
153. See YOUNG, supra note 126, at 176–211 (identifying numerous issues that would likely be
addressed as part of negotiations over Quebec’s secession from Canada).
154. See infra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.
155. CASSESE, supra note 96, at 254.
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international law’s role with respect to possible Flemish, Scottish, or
Catalan secession. International law does not grant these stateless nations a
unilateral right to secede. At most, it delineates how independence may be
achieved through referendum and negotiation. This position is consistent
with international law’s inherent deference to state sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Unlike in Quebec, however, the debates over Flemish,
Scottish, and Catalan secession also occur within the context of the EU,
which provides a unique setting in which to consider self-determination
claims.
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FORUM FOR SELFDETERMINATION CLAIMS
European integration was not always popular among nationalists in
Europe’s stateless nations. The SNP, for example, argued that integration
amounted merely to the transfer of sovereignty over Scotland from one
alien government in London to another in Brussels.156 Yet by the 1980s,
the SNP had become a firm supporter of the European project and a
proponent of “Independence in Europe.”157 Flemish nationalists have also
embraced integration, and the N-VA describes itself as “an extremely proEuropean party” that supports both “a stronger Flanders and a stronger
Europe.”158 The centrality of the EU to Catalan nationalist discourse is
evident in the banners carried by demonstrators in Barcelona calling for
Catalonia to become a “New European State,”159 in the Declaration of
Sovereignty’s assurance that “[t]he founding principles of the European
Union shall be defended and promoted,”160 and in Artur Mas’s proposed
wording for a future referendum question: “Do you want Catalonia to
become a new state within the European Union?”161
It is overly simplistic to conclude that the EU encourages or
discourages separatism or that it makes secession easier or more difficult.
Nonetheless, European integration “affect[s] how the parties to a

156. See LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 84 (“SNP opposition to the [European Community] primarily
involved sovereignty over Scottish affairs: . . . whether ‘rule’ from Brussels would be any better than
‘rule’ from Westminster . . . .”).
157. See id. at 105–13 (tracing the “Europeanization” of the SNP’s strategy, including its
“Independence in Europe” campaign, during the 1980s).
158. FAQ: Is the N-VA a Pro-Europe Party?, NIEUW-VLAAMSE ALLIANTIE, http://international.nva.be/en/about/faq (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
159. Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1.
160. DECLARATION OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40.
161. Giles Tremlett, Catalonia Leader Threatens to Draw EU into Independence Row with Spain,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 15, 2012, 10:47 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/15/catalonia-leaderthreat-independence-eu-spain.
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[separatist] conflict perceive their own interests and identities.”162 Three
aspects of the EU play a particularly important role in shaping Flemish,
Scottish, and Catalan self-determination claims and considering how such
claims might be addressed: the respective roles of states and regions in EU
institutions, the rules governing EU membership, and the debates over the
future of Europe in the wake of the eurozone crisis.
A. States and Regions
Although it is often obscured by considerations of the EU’s impact on
sovereignty, the fact remains that the EU is in many ways governed
“through cooperation among the governments of its member states” rather
than by supranational structures with independent authority.163 States
remain the primary actors within the EU system. Membership in the EU is
limited to sovereign states that meet the EU’s admissions criteria and that
are admitted through a unanimous vote by member states.164 Once
admitted to membership, states participate directly in the EU’s primary
governing institutions: the European Council (consisting of ministers from
each member state), the European Commission (consisting of one
commissioner from each member state), and the European Parliament
(consisting of elected representatives from the member states).165 Thus,
“[s]tatehood in the EU . . . retains meaning for nationalists because it still
remains the sole means by which nationalists can be recognized as
sovereign equals in the European political system.”166
Attempts to establish formal channels for regional participation in EU
governance have produced only limited results. During the 1980s and
1990s, it became popular to envision a “Europe of the Regions,” in which
local governments would replace states as the primary building blocks of a
more fully integrated Europe. Many regions established “information
offices” in Brussels in an effort to access the emerging European
policymaking structures.167 Bolstering the Europe of the Regions idea was
the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993.168 Maastricht
162. Bruno Coppieters, Secessionist Conflicts in Europe, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PHENOMENON: FROM AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR TO CONTEMPORARY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS, supra
note 94, at 237, 243.
163. JOHN PINDER & SIMON USHERWOOD, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
36 (2d ed. 2007).
164. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 1 (setting forth the application process for EU membership).
165. PINDER & USHERWOOD, supra note 163, at 36–55.
166. LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 23.
167. Id. at 25.
168. Hopkins, supra note 11, at 26–27; see also Treaty of Maastricht on European Union,
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enshrined the principle of subsidiarity (pursuant to which authority over
any given area of competency should be vested at the lowest possible
political level) in EU law, established a Committee of the Regions, and
allowed regional ministers to sit on member state delegations in the
European Council where the member state deemed such participation
appropriate.169
Yet on balance, the robust regional role that the Maastricht Treaty
appeared to promise has never fully materialized. According to Laible,
“many observers point not to the strength of regions in EU policymaking,
but to their weakness. Even before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty,
analysts were suggesting that the notion of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ was
premature; post-Maastricht developments have not altered this
perception.”170 Indeed, the Committee of the Regions has come to
symbolize the limitations on regional participation: its powers are
essentially consultative, and the Commission and Council need not follow
its recommendations.171 Furthermore, membership in the Committee is
open to a wide range of local governments (including, for example,
municipalities), which arguably dilutes its value as a vehicle for pursuing
the interests of stateless nations with considerable domestic autonomy.172
More recently, the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 provided notable, though
modest, expansions of formal regional power.173 Consequently, it gained
appreciable support from sub-state nationalists.174 The Treaty strengthens
the Committee of the Regions by requiring the Commission, Council, and
Parliament to consult it on matters concerning local or regional
government, and it allows the Committee to challenge EU laws that it
Summaries of EU Legislation, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/
treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2010) (providing background on the
Maastricht Treaty and an overview of its structure and objectives).
169. Id.
170. LAIBLE, supra note 6, at 36.
171. Hopkins, supra note 11, at 27–29.
172. See id. at 28 (describing the Committee of the Regions as “a committee with a huge variety of
local, regional, and national representatives. The idea that a Minister-President of Bavaria could talk
meaningfully with a local councillor from the UK was farcical and there was soon a major split in the
committee.”).
173. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009).
174. See Nick Meo & Patrick Hennessy, European Union’s Lisbon Treaty Fuels Flames of Dissent
Across Continent, TELEGRAPH (London), June 28, 2009, 8:30 AM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/eu/5664631/European-Unions-Lisbon-Treaty-fuels-flames-of-dissent-acrosscontinent.html (“[L]eaders of some of Europe’s separatist movements are celebrating the progress of
the treaty towards full ratification. They are convinced that the more powerful the EU’s own
institutions become, the weaker the nation state⎯and the stronger the case for granting breakaway
regions their independence.”).
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believes run afoul of the subsidiarity principle in the European Court of
Justice (ECJ).175 Although it remains to be seen whether the Lisbon Treaty
signals a shift towards greater formal regional participation in the EU, the
Treaty’s guarantees for regions fall short of the direct authority afforded to
member states and thus seem to provide only a glimmer of hope to those
still dreaming of a Europe of the Regions.
Beyond the Committee of the Regions, the nature and extent of formal
regional participation in EU affairs remains largely in the hands of
individual member states. Consistent with its high degree of regional
autonomy, Belgium often sends both Flemish and Walloon representatives
to the European Council, although they must advance Belgian (rather than
regional) positions.176 By contrast, Spain and the United Kingdom have
been more reluctant to allow representatives of their stateless nations to
participate formally in the EU.177 One consequence of the general lack of
regional participation is the potential for a disconnect between powers
devolved to regions within their respective parent states and competency
areas falling under the umbrella of the EU: a region might have authority
over a particular issue at the domestic level but be unable to fully
participate in EU policymaking concerning that issue.
Yet despite the foregoing constraints on formal participation, regions
have created informal networks to advance their interests. For example,
Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalist members of the European
Parliament have joined with representatives of other stateless nations to
form the European Free Alliance, which “gathers 40 progressive,
nationalist, regionalist and autonomist parties throughout the European
Union” and “focuses its activity on the promotion of the right of selfdetermination of peoples.”178 Moreover, Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia
participate in the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power
(REGLEG), an informal network dedicated to increasing the role of
legislative regions in EU affairs through “policy formation in accordance
with the principles of subsidiarity.”179
Regions also derive benefits from their status as regions. For
175. Committee of the Regions, A New Treaty: A New Role for Regions and Local Authorities, at
2–3, available at http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/brochures/Documents/84fa6e84-0373-42a2a801-c8ea83a24a72.pdf.
176. KEATING, supra note 6, at 156.
177. See id. at 155–57 (describing Spanish and British regions’ more limited formal participation
in the EU).
178. What’s EFA and History, EUR. FREE ALLIANCE, http://www.e-f-a.org/about-us/whats-efaand-history/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
179. About Regleg, REGLEG, http://www.regleg.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=section
&layout=blog&id=2&Itemid=2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
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example, they receive EU structural funds funneled through their parent
states.180 In addition, regions fall within the ambit of the EU’s “rights
regime,” which ensures cultural and linguistic protections for minority
groups and provides a degree of formal recognition of minority cultures at
the supranational level.181
Perhaps most significantly, the EU provides stateless nations with
opportunities to engage in “paradiplomacy.”182 Catalonia in particular has
actively projected Catalan interests beyond the borders of the Spanish state
by integrating itself into the broader European economy, promoting
Catalan culture, and cultivating inter-regional links such as the “Four
Motors of Europe,” a collaboration among Catalonia and the similarly
wealthy regions of Baden-Württemburg (Germany), Rhône-Alpes (France),
and Lombardy (Italy) designed to promote regional economic
development.183 Catalonia has thus been described as a “region state” that
manages to participate in European affairs, particularly economic affairs,
despite remaining within Spain.184 The success of Catalan paradiplomacy
may help to explain why, until recently, Catalan nationalism typically took
the form of demands for increased autonomy rather than outright
independence.
Flanders has likewise engaged in paradiplomacy beyond the borders
of Belgium, often by promoting Flemish culture and courting international
investment.185 Unlike Scotland or Catalonia, Flanders possesses the ability
to enter into international agreements in those areas over which it has
authority at the domestic level.186 The impact of successful paradiplomacy
on nationalist discourse in Flanders⎯operating within a conspicuously
weak Belgian state⎯is far different than in Catalonia.
Whereas
paradiplomacy has arguably tempered calls for Catalan independence, in
Flanders it has lent support to the argument that the parent state is
180. KEATING, supra note 6, at 153–54.
181. Id. at 143–47.
182. See generally PARADIPLOMACY IN ACTION: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF SUBNATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS (Francisco Aldecoa & Michael Keating eds., 1999) (providing an in-depth description
of the concept of paradiplomacy and its operation in various regions throughout the world).
183. MCROBERTS, supra note 13, at 110–11. This collaboration is also sometimes known as the
Four Motors for Europe.
Organization, FOUR MOTORS FOR EUR., http://www.4motors.eu/Organization-.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
184. MCROBERTS, supra note 13, at 113–14.
185. KEATING, supra note 6, at 156; see also Organization, FOUR MOTORS FOR EUR.,
http://4motors.eu/-Organization-.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (noting that Flanders is also associated
with the Four Motors of Europe, although it is not a full member).
186. See KEATING, supra note 6, at 156 (“Belgian regions and communities have full external
competences corresponding to their internal competences, and this has led to a large presence
abroad . . . .”).
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irrelevant in the emerging supranational order. The perceived irrelevance
of the Belgian state in an integrating Europe underlies Bart De Wever’s
claims that Belgium is “doomed”187 and that Belgium’s breakup would be
“barely noticed by anyone.”188 In advancing such claims, Flemish
nationalists often draw on the principle of subsidiarity to argue that
authority should reside at the Flemish regional level, which already plays a
more significant role in the lives of its citizens than does the diminished
Belgian state.189 In this respect, paradiplomacy and subsidiarity dovetail
with a belief (often also expressed by Scottish nationalists) that the EU
makes independence more practical and desirable by over-representing
small states in EU institutions190 and providing them with ready access to a
common market.191
The differing outcomes of Catalan and Flemish paradiplomacy reflect
the contradictory influence of EU institutions on sub-state nationalism. On
the one hand, formal and informal regional participation in these
institutions can operate as an escape valve for nationalist pressures, thereby

187. Flemish Leader Says Belgium is Doomed, EURACTIV.COM (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.euractiv.com/elections/flemish-leader-belgium-doomed-news-508873.
188. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Stares, supra note 5 (quoting an N-VA spokesman as saying that “democracy needs
to be closer to the people, and that is why we are a regionalist party”); Flemish Leader Says Belgium is
Doomed, supra note 187 (noting De Wever’s statement that the N-VA “believe[s] in subsidiarity” and
his argument that “smaller countries are more efficient in decision-making and economic reform”). But
for an overview of the subsidiarity principle that challenges the Flemish nationalist position, see
Andrew Evans, Regional Dimensions to European Governance, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 28–32
(2003). As Evans explains, while sub-state nationalist interpretations of subsidiarity have some
support, there is equal or greater support for the narrower position that subsidiarity refers primarily to
relationships between the EU and its member states. Id. Ultimately, according to Evans, “subsidiarity
fails to secure the structural adaptation of Union law necessary for legal organisation of regionalism.”
Id. at 31.
190. See, e.g., YOUR SCOTLAND, YOUR VOICE, supra note 48, at 111 (“Within the United
Kingdom, Scotland has six MEPs [Members of the European Parliament], but independent countries of
a comparable size to Scotland, such as Denmark, have thirteen MEPs as representation is calculated so
that there are proportionally fewer MEPs for larger states than for smaller ones.”).
191. See id. at 44 (“As a full member of the European Union, Scotland would continue to have
access to its markets. Independence would enhance the opportunities for Scotland’s wider international
trade and investment, underpinned by foreign and fiscal policies dedicated to Scotland’s political, social
and economic interests.”); Alex Salmond, How Scotland Will Lead the World, ECONOMIST: THE
WORLD IN 2012, Nov. 17, 2011, at 106, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21536989
(arguing for the economic benefits of Scottish independence); FAQ: Is Flanders Too Small to Be Able
to Do It All Alone?, NIEUW-VLAAMSE ALLIANTIE, http://international.n-va.be/en/about/faq#faq-fla-eur
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (“Only one country on the list of the top 10 most prosperous countries in the
world has more inhabitants than Flanders: the U.S. Therefore, being small doesn’t have to be a
problem, if people openly and effectively participate in globalisation. A country like Denmark, for
example, has almost the same number of inhabitants as Flanders and is listed as number one in all
European ranking systems.”).
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lowering the demand for separation. On the other hand, by largely limiting
direct participation in its affairs to member states, and by providing regions
with opportunities to demonstrate that they can act on their own, the EU
can encourage separatist aspirations.
For any stateless nation
contemplating the leap from sub-state region to sovereign state, however, a
fundamental question remains: would it automatically obtain a place within
the EU?
B. The Membership Question
The membership question has become the elephant in the room as substate nationalism has gained momentum in recent years. “Independence in
Europe” arguments often take the European dimension for granted; substate nationalists simply assume either that their new states would
automatically possess membership in the EU or, at the very least, that they
would easily gain admission through an expedited and streamlined
process.192 Thus, it was viewed as a major setback for sub-state nationalists
when, during a September 2012 interview with the BBC and again in a
December 2012 letter to the House of Lords, European Commission
president José Manuel Barroso opined that a new state created by secession
from an EU member state would have to apply for membership on its own,
following the EU’s standard application procedure.193
Unfortunately for sub-state nationalists, Barroso’s position is
supported by international law and the practice of international
organizations. New states typically do not succeed to (i.e., automatically

192. See, e.g., Stephen Castle, Scots’ Referendum Raises a Slew of Legal Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/world/europe/scots-referendum-raises-a-slew-of-legalissues.html (quoting Scottish deputy first minister Nicola Sturgeon as stating that, following
independence, “[w]e would automatically be members of the E.U.,” and Catalan nationalist Oriol
Junqueras’s position that “Catalonia should become an independent state and automatically a member
state of the E.U.”).
193. See Severin Carrell, Barroso Casts Doubt on Independent Scotland’s EU Membership Rights,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2012, 12:42 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/sep/12/barroso-doubtscotland-eu-membership (quoting Barroso as stating that “[a] new state, if it wants to join the European
Union, has to apply to become a member like any state” and that the EU’s membership procedure is “a
procedure of international law”); Scottish Independence: EC’s Barroso Says New States Need “Apply to
Join EU,” BBC News, BBC.COM (Dec. 10, 2012, 13:11 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotlandscotland-politics-20664907 (describing Barroso’s letter to a House of Lords economic committee
investigating the potential ramifications of Scottish independence). For the full text of Barroso’s letter
to the House of Lords, see Letter from José Manuel Barroso, President, European Comm’n, to Lord
Tugendhat, Acting Chairman, U.K. House of Lords Econ. Affairs Comm. (Oct. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/economic-affairs/ScottishIndependence/EA68_
Scotland_and_the_EU_Barroso’s_reply_to_Lord_Tugendhat_101212.pdf (“[A] new independent state
would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the treaties
would no longer apply on its territory.”).
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inherit) the international treaty obligations of their former parent states,
especially with regard to treaties governing membership in international
organizations. Instead, international organizations usually require new
states to accede to (i.e., separately obtain) membership. Although
secession from an EU member state would be without precedent and the
EU’s governing treaties are silent as to how such a situation should be
handled, there are both legal and political reasons why it might adhere to
the general requirement of accession.
At first glance, Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties suggests that a new state’s
succession to the treaty obligations of its former parent state is automatic:
1. When a part or parts of a territory of a State separate to form one or
more States, whether or not the predecessor state continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of
the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect
of each successor state so formed.194

With respect to treaties governing membership in international
organizations, however, the effect of Article 34 is limited by Article 4 of
the Convention, which stipulates that the Convention applies “without
prejudice to the rules concerning acquisition of membership and without
prejudice to any other relevant rules of the organization.”195 In other
words, the membership rules of a given international organization take
precedence over the provisions of the Vienna Convention. As the UN
General Assembly’s International Law Commission explained during the
drafting of the Convention:
In many organizations, membership, other than original membership, is
subject to a formal process of admission. Where this is so, practice
appears now to have established the principle that a new State is not
entitled automatically to become a party to the constituent treaty and a
member of the organization as a successor State, simply by reason of the
fact that at the date of the succession its territory was subject to the treaty
and within the ambit of the organization.196

194. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (with annex) art. 34(1)(a),
concluded Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3.
195. Id. art. 4.
196. Draft Articles on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties with Commentaries, [1974] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 174, 177–78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/3_2_1974.pdf.
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Although the Vienna Convention does not represent customary
international law,197 it does tend to reflect the approach of international
organizations to membership issues arising from the creation of new states
on the former territory of member states. The UN first confronted the
question of treaty succession in 1947, when British India, an original
member of the UN, achieved independence and immediately was
partitioned into two separate states: India and Pakistan.198
After
considerable debate, the UN concluded that India continued British India’s
legal personality, including its membership in the UN, while Pakistan
would be required to apply for UN membership as a new state.199 In
reaching this conclusion, the UN’s Sixth (Legal) Committee established
general guidelines for evaluating succession to UN membership:
1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal principles to
presume that a State which is a Member of the Organization of the
United Nations does not cease to be a Member simply because its
Constitution or its frontier have been subjected to changes, and that the
extinction of the State as a legal personality recognized in the
international order must be shown before its rights and obligations can
be considered thereby to have ceased to exist.
2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and
populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a
State Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the
Charter claim that status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has
been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the
Charter.
3. Beyond that, each case must be judged according to its merits.200

The overarching principle that the UN established in addressing the
partition of India and Pakistan⎯that a member state retains its membership
despite a loss of territory, while a new state established on the former
territory of a member state must apply for membership on its own⎯has
continued to guide the UN’s approach to membership issues arising from

197. See Status of Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, United
Nations Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&lang=en (last updated Oct. 11, 2013, 08:30 EDT)
(indicating that the Vienna Convention has been ratified by only 22 states and, moreover, that Belgium,
Spain, and the United Kingdom have not ratified the Convention).
198. Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United
Nations, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 29, 34 (1995).
199. Id. at 34–35.
200. Chairman of the Sixth Committee, Letter dated Oct. 8, 1947 from the Chairman addressed to
the Chairman of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (Oct. 11, 1947).
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changes to the territorial composition of its member states.201 Other
international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, have adopted similar approaches.202
Like the UN Charter, the EU’s governing treaties do not contain any
provisions for dealing with secession or the membership issues it raises.203
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that the EU would follow the
UN’s approach. Like most international organizations, the EU may be
viewed as a voluntary association of like-minded states with a fundamental
interest in maintaining control over its membership. In other words,
“membership of any international organization has as its essence a
willingness to co-operate in the furtherance of schemes of international
solidarity. Such a willingness cannot be assumed on the part of a new State
whose territory falls within the ambit of these schemes.”204 Indeed, as
noted above, EU membership is limited to states that meet certain criteria
and that are admitted through a unanimous vote.205 To allow for automatic
treaty succession would be to allow a new state to make an end run around
the EU’s membership rules. Moreover, the EU’s governing treaties
allocate representation in EU institutions and access to structural funds
proportionally among the member states, and these treaties must therefore
be amended each time a new state is admitted.206
EU member states’ responses to Kosovo’s declaration of
independence suggest that, if secessionist states do not automatically
succeed to EU membership, obtaining the necessary unanimous vote for
accession would be fraught with political complications. Five EU member
states faced with separatist movements of their own⎯Spain, Cyprus,
Romania, Slovakia, and Greece⎯refused to recognize Kosovo as an
independent state, lest doing so set a precedent for their own
dismemberment.207 These states (not to mention Belgium or the United

201. See Matthew Happold, Independence: In or Out of Europe? An Independent Scotland and the
European Union, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 15, 23–25 (2000) (surveying the UN’s responses to various
instances of secession and dissolution).
202. Id. at 25–26.
203. See ARABELLA THORP & GAVIN THOMPSON, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, STANDARD
NOTE SN06110, SCOTLAND, INDEPENDENCE AND THE EU 4 (Nov. 8, 2011, amended July 13, 2012),
available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06110 (“Nothing in the EU Treaties sets out
what would happen in the event of part of a Member State becoming independent.”).
204. D.P. O’CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 65 (1956).
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
206. THORP & THOMPSON, supra note 203, at 4–5.
207. Simon James, EU Reactions to Kosovo’s Independence: The Lessons for Scotland 4–7 (Aug.
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/39433019/EU-Reactionsto-Kosovos-Independence-The-Lessons-for-Scotland.
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Kingdom) might withhold the votes necessary for accession. At the very
least, the EU’s member states could make secession painful by holding up
the membership applications of seceding states or by admitting them on
less generous terms (e.g., limiting their access to structural funds) than they
currently enjoy as sub-state regions.208
Secession would further require the EU to address issues pertaining to
continuity and extinction. As the UN’s response to the partition of India
and the Sixth Committee’s subsequent guidelines demonstrate, the
threshold question for evaluating membership issues is whether, following
secession, the predecessor state continues to exist. International law
generally presumes the continued existence of states, even when those
states experience losses of territory or population; the extinction of states is
relatively rare.209
Michael P. Scharf has identified six factors that the international
community has considered when determining whether a state has dissolved
or whether a potential successor territory has inherited its legal personality:
“whether the potential successor has: (a) a substantial majority of the
former [state’s] territory (including the historic territorial hub), (b) a
majority of its population, (c) a majority of its resources, (d) a majority of
its armed forces, (e) the seat of government and control of most central
government institutions, and (f) entered into a devolution agreement [i.e.,
an agreement on continuation of legal personality] . . . with the other
components of the former State.”210 Where an established state experiences
an instance of secession but nonetheless continues to satisfy most or all of
the six factors, it is deemed to continue the predecessor state’s legal
personality: its sovereign reach is compromised but its legal existence is
unaffected. Thus, for example, the UN deemed India (following the
partition of Pakistan) and Russia (following the independence of numerous
former Soviet republics) to have inherited the legal personalities of British
India and the Soviet Union, respectively.211 By contrast, if following an
instance of secession there is no potential successor that can demonstrate
continuity with the predecessor state, then the international community
may conclude that the predecessor state is extinct. The most recent
example of such involuntary state extinction was the dissolution of
Yugoslavia following the violent breakaway of most of its constituent
208. See Happold, supra note 201, at 33–34 (speculating on the terms of Scotland’s admission to
the EU).
209. See CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 716 (listing the small number of states that ceased to exist
between 1945 and 2005).
210. Scharf, supra note 198, at 67.
211. Id. at 33–41, 43–52, 68.
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republics in the early 1990s.212
Questions concerning continuity or extinction would be most easily
answered in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia. Owing to Scotland’s
relatively small size, population, and proportion of Britain’s economic
wealth, the rump United Kingdom would almost certainly continue its legal
personality following Scottish independence, including its membership in
the EU.213 An independent Scotland would thus be considered a new state
with respect to the EU treaties and would be required to apply for
admission on its own. A similar analysis may be applied to Catalonia,
which, while a significant component of the Spanish state, comprises only a
fraction of Spain’s population, territory, and economy, and lies beyond
Spain’s historic territorial hub and seat of government. In the Scottish and
Catalan cases, then, secession would result in the creation of new states
without breaking the continuity of the predecessor states. Still, the
diminished British and Spanish states would face a reduction of their
representation in EU bodies, which would require amendments to EU
treaties even before the issue of membership for the new Scottish and
Catalan states was addressed.
Belgium is more complicated. There, straightforward application of
Scharf’s six factors would lead to an anomalous result: Flanders comprises
the majority of Belgium’s territory and population and controls the lion’s
share of its economic wealth, and it would thus be the most obvious
candidate to inherit Belgium’s legal personality. To allow for this
outcome, however, would be to transform Flemish secession into a
situation where Flanders had, in effect, kicked Wallonia out of the Belgian
state.
The future of the Belgian state would undoubtedly be addressed as

212. Id. at 52–65. The international community’s determination that the Yugoslav state had
dissolved was deeply controversial. Until 2000, Serbia and Montenegro laid claim to Yugoslavia’s
legal personality and its seat at the UN. CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 707–08. Several factors
supported Serbia and Montenegro’s claim of continuity, including its possession of a large proportion
(though not the majority) of the former Yugoslavia’s territory and population, its capital (Belgrade), and
most of its central government institutions and armed forces. Scharf, supra note 198, at 53–54.
Undoubtedly, the international community’s rejection of Serbia and Montenegro’s claim was based in
large part on Serbia’s perceived role in fomenting the violence associated with the breakup of
Yugoslavia.
In the end⎯or rather, very soon after the beginning [of the wars in the former Yugoslavia]⎯a
position had to be taken as to whether one of the six republics [i.e., Serbia] was not, under the
guise of the federal State, waging through the national army and various surrogates in the
other Republics an irredentist war. If so . . . it should not be given the moral and legal
advantage which would flow from being able to characterize the conflict as civil and its own
position as metropolitan.
CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 714.
213. Happold, supra note 201, at 28.
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part of the negotiations leading to Flemish secession. The obvious
precedent is the “velvet divorce” that dissolved Czechoslovakia and created
separate Czech and Slovak states in 1993. The Czech Republic could have
made a convincing claim to be the successor to the Czechoslovak state
given that it possessed the majority of the former state’s territory,
population, and resources.214 Instead, the agreement between the Czech
Republic and Slovakia stipulated that, as of December 31, 1992,
Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.215 Pursuant to the agreement, neither of the
new states laid claim to the predecessor state’s legal personality but instead
established their own legal personalities (e.g., through applying separately
for membership in international organizations, such as the UN).216
Observers have frequently suggested that Belgium might be headed
towards its own “velvet divorce.”217
The critical complication,
however⎯which had no corollary in the Czechoslovak case⎯is Brussels.
Flemish nationalists envision Brussels as a part of any future Flemish
state.218 But many Walloons⎯not to mention many francophones in
Brussels itself⎯argue that in the event of Flemish secession, Brussels
should be joined to Wallonia.219 This might involve incorporation not only
of Brussels proper but also of some francophone suburbs or a corridor of
territory between Brussels and the Walloon border.220
In such
circumstances, Wallonia could make a more credible case that it represents
214. Scharf, supra note 198, at 65 & n.191.
215. Id. at 65. Notably, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was effectuated through legislation
negotiated by political leaders and without any popular referendum. CRAWFORD, supra note 93, at 706.
In fact, it would appear that at the time of dissolution, a majority of Czechoslovakians opposed the
breakup of their state. Salvatore Massa, Note, Secession by Mutual Assent: A Comparative Analysis of
the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the Separatist Movement in Canada, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 183,
191–92 (1995).
216. Scharf, supra note 198, at 65–67. At first, the Czech Republic and Slovakia attempted to
divide Czechoslovakia’s seats in various UN subsidiary bodies between themselves, but the UN
rejected this approach. Id.
217. See, e.g., Jan Hunin, We Need a Velvet Divorce, DE VOLKSKRANT (Amsterdam), June 21,
2011, available at http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/728711-we-need-velvet-divorce; Jan
Silva, Belgium Studies Czechoslovakia Breakup, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2007, 1:37 PM,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-09-11-1753401458_x.htm.
218. See FAQ: What Will Happen to Brussels If Flanders Becomes Independent?, NIEUWVLAAMSE ALLIANTIE, http://international.n-va.be/en/about/faq (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (“Brussels
therefore remains an extremely important city for Flanders, even if far fewer Flemings are living there
now. The N-VA therefore definitely does not want to let it go.”).
219. See, e.g., Philippe Van Parijs, Brussels after Belgium: Fringe Town or City-State?, BULLETIN
(Brussels), Oct. 4, 2007, at 14, available at http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/etes/documents/2007
zp.Brussels_Bulletin.final.pdf (arguing that most residents of Brussels would oppose inclusion in an
independent Flanders).
220. See id. (suggesting that the majority French-speaking areas around Brussels could be joined to
Wallonia to allow Brussels and Wallonia to become contiguous).
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the continuation of the Belgian state. Under a third scenario, Brussels
would become an autonomous capital district⎯in effect, the EU’s version
of Washington, D.C.221 While this latter scenario might solve continuity
and extinction issues (the international community would almost certainly
consider Belgium dissolved), it would nonetheless present a different
headache for the EU: the loss of one member state and two new states (or
perhaps three, depending on the status of the Brussels capital district within
the EU) seeking admission.222
For obvious reasons, the EU is unlikely to endorse any scenario that
leaves its capital outside of the EU.223 Indeed, although international law,
the practice of international organizations, and the EU’s membership rules
suggest that secessionist states would be required to accede to membership,
there are also legal and practical reasons for engaging in “internal
enlargement” on more streamlined terms. These reasons highlight the
fundamental difference between the EU and typical international
organizations: unlike, for example, the UN, the EU operates in some
respects like a federal state. Thus, the people of Flanders, Scotland, and
Catalonia possess rights as EU citizens, and requiring accession would
involve stripping them of citizenship pending readmission.224 Moreover,
221. Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 61, at 174 & n.122. But see Van Parijs, supra note 219
(arguing that a Brussels city-state would possess “the status of an EU member state, with all the
corresponding rights and obligations, and thus would be in no way comparable to Washington DC”).
222. In yet another possible scenario, Wallonia might forego independent statehood and instead
seek to unite with France. See Leo Cendrowitz, No Love Lost: Is Belgium About to Break in Two?,
TIME, June 30, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2000517,00.html (“In Wallonia,
polls have suggested voters would seek to join France if the country was divided (on the other side of
the border, polls show the French would gladly accept them).”). In that case, Wallonia might
automatically remain within the EU in much the same way that East Germany became part of the
European Community (EC) when it united with West Germany, an EC member. See Happold, supra
note 201, at 33.
223. The EU’s position with respect to Brussels is similar to the UN’s position with respect to the
Soviet Union’s seat on the UN Security Council. Had the UN concluded that the Soviet Union
dissolved and that no successor state existed, it would have left open a Security Council seat. Scharf,
supra note 198, at 47. The UN’s desire to avoid this outcome undoubtedly influenced its decision to
recognize Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union’s legal personality and thus as the heir to its seat
on the Security Council. See id. at 47–49 (describing the other permanent members’ desire not to
encourage further expansion or reform of the Security Council).
224. See JORDI MATAS I DALMASES ET AL., CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS, THE INTERNAL
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CASE OF A MEMBER STATE’S SECESSION OR DISSOLUTION 25–28
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ideasforeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/The-internalenlargement-of-the-EU-Final.pdf.pdf (identifying EU citizenship as a cornerstone of the EU’s “system
of constitutional and democratic values” and thus as a reason for supporting the “internal enlargement”
of the EU in the event of secession); see also Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State:
Towards a New Paradigm in International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447, 469 (1993) (“The creation of a
‘citizenship of the Union’ as provided in the Maastricht Treaty gives legal expression to broader
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EU law is already applicable in Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia, and
Flanders and Catalonia fall within both the eurozone, which provides for
the use of a common currency, and the terms of the Schengen Agreement,
which eliminated border controls between most EU member states.225 To
disentangle these stateless nations from the EU system would be highly
problematic and arguably not worth the effort, especially since they would
almost certainly qualify for membership as independent states. While
putting them to the back of the membership queue might conform with the
letter of the law and satisfy the punitive impulses of EU member states
threatened by their own secessionist movements, it might also be an
unnecessary adherence to form over function.
In the end, how the EU answers the membership question⎯whether it
is guided strictly by the law or by a desire for political compromise⎯may
depend on the nature of the EU that these new states are seeking to join.
Here, the eurozone crisis and its potential long-term effects on European
integration come into play.
C. The Eurozone Crisis
As a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community
(the forerunner of the EU),226 the site of the EU’s de facto capital, and a
wealthy multinational state in the heart of Europe, Belgium may be viewed
as emblematic of the goals of European integration. Thus, when set against
the backdrop of the eurozone crisis, Belgium’s recent political woes have
raised troubling questions concerning the future of Europe. According to
the Economist:
The two crises have parallels: for both Belgium and the single currency,
breaking up is no longer unthinkable. Indeed, Belgium might be seen as
a microcosm of the EU, with a wealthy, Germanic north fed up with
subsidising a poorer, Latin south. If prosperous little Belgium cannot
resolve its internal rivalries, say many, what chance for the EU?227
political identifications going beyond the State of the individual’s nationality. European citizenship
ensures freedom of movement and residence in the entire Community, allows participation in local
elections and in elections for the European Parliament irrespective of the place of residence of a
candidate within the Community, and confers the right to diplomatic protection by any Member
State.”).
225. See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, Summaries of EU Legislation, EUR. UNION,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_i
mmigration/l33020_en.htm (last updated Aug. 3, 2009) (describing the Schengen Agreement and noting
that Belgium and Spain fall within the “Schengen area”).
226. Jonty Bloom, The European Coal and Steel Community Turns 60, BBC News, BBC.COM
(Aug. 9, 2012, 19:00 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19194812.
227. Charlemagne: Ceci N’est Plus Un Pays: How Europe’s Debt Crisis Could Help to Solve
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Similar parallels can be drawn between the EU and Spain, where
Catalans seek independence in part to end what they view as onerous
economic ties to a poorer parent state.228
The eurozone crisis is not the sole, or even primary, explanation for
the recent rise of sub-state nationalism. Nationalist movements existed in
Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia long before the current economic
downturn and, indeed, before the process of European integration even
began.229 Still, the eurozone crisis and sub-state nationalism are linked in
at least three important respects.
First, the eurozone crisis has affected the degree of support for
separation. Here, Catalonia and Scotland offer contrasting examples. In
Catalonia, the eurozone crisis has been a boon to the nationalist cause.
Spain’s increasingly uncertain position within the eurozone, and the
squabbles among the Spanish government and its regions over how to
revive Spain’s crippled economy, have laid bare the longstanding fiscal
tensions between Madrid and Barcelona.230 Catalan nationalists have
capitalized on the eurozone crisis by arguing that a Catalonia freed from
the shackles of the Spanish economy would take its place among the
wealthier and more stable states of the European “north.”231
Two political science explanations of separatist nationalism shed light
on Catalan nationalists’ response to the eurozone crisis. First, historical
fluctuations in support for Catalan nationalism may be characterized as the
reaction of Catalan institutions to threats to their autonomy emanating from
Madrid.232 When the Spanish state seeks to rein in these institutions by
implementing centralizing policies⎯as it has done during the eurozone
crisis by imposing austerity measures on the regions and by refusing
Catalonia’s demand for a new tax distribution arrangement⎯the result is
an uptick in nationalist sentiment.233

Belgium’s Political Impasses, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2011, at 52, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/18988904.
228. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1 (“Mas has managed to deflect fury over his region’s
economic problems onto the central government, saying if the tax system were set up differently
Catalonia would not be in its quagmire.”).
232. GREER, supra note 44, at 119–26 (describing Catalan institutions’ backlash against the
centralizing policies of the Spanish state during the 1980s).
233. See id. at 182–83 (arguing that “the possibility of a near-existential threat to regional
organizations’ autonomy and environmental stability” might increase support for secession); see also
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Second, the recent rise of separatist nationalism in Catalonia may be
explained in terms of Donald L. Horowitz’s theories concerning the logic
of secessionist politics in economically advanced regions. Horowitz
observes that advanced regions may consider breaking with their more
backward parent states in order to retain control of their revenues and avoid
subsidizing poorer regions.234 Yet he also argues that these potential
benefits of secession are often trumped by the benefits that inure to
advanced regions that remain within their parent states: namely, the
abilities to export surplus capital outside of the region, to take advantage of
domestic markets for manufactured goods, and to allow residents of the
advanced region to move freely throughout the parent state in search of
further economic opportunities.235
Under ordinary circumstances,
secession would result in the loss of such benefits. The EU, however,
changes the calculus for advanced regions such as Catalonia: following
independence, if EU membership were secured, Catalans would still enjoy
access both to Spanish markets and the markets of other EU member states.
Thus, the EU may be viewed as eliminating an important brake on the
separatist aspirations of economically advanced regions. To be sure,
Catalan nationalist arguments concerning the economic benefits of
secession may be overstated: there is a distinct possibility that an
independent Catalonia would go from being Spain’s Germany to a member
of the EU’s poorer “south.”236
Still, the prospect of economic
independence from a crisis-wracked Spain has played a major role in
increasing support for Catalan nationalism.
In Scotland, the eurozone crisis has had the opposite effect on
nationalist support: the continent’s economic uncertainty has highlighted
the potential pitfalls of independence. Whereas Catalonia is Spain’s
economic powerhouse, Scotland plays a more marginal role in the United
Kingdom’s economy and is more dependent on subsidies from the central
government.237 Prior to the eurozone crisis, in the midst of the economic
Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1 (“Many Catalans are suspicious of what they see as the centralizing aims of
the People’s Party.”).
234. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 249–54 (2d ed. 2000).
235. See id. at 250–53 (arguing that “[m]ost of the time, the lure of interests and opportunities
throughout the undivided state is enough to ward off the possibility” of secession).
236. See Harriet Alexander, Catalonia’s Growing Calls for Independence Add to Spain’s
Worsening Euro Crisis Woes, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 30, 2012, 3:31 PM BST, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9576459/Catalonias-growing-calls-forindependence-add-to-Spains-worsening-euro-crisis-woes.html (“‘An economist just this morning told
me that he saw Catalonia as being to Spain what Germany is to Europe,’ said Joan Vidal, chief of staff
for the president of Spain’s most economically powerful region.”).
237. See Stephanie Flanders, Scotland: A Case of Give and Take, BBC News, BBC.COM (Jan. 9.
2012, 13:08 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16477990 (noting, however, that the discrepancy
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boom of the early 2000s, the SNP was able to argue that an independent
Scotland would join an “arc of prosperity” consisting of smaller states,
such as Ireland and Iceland, whose economies were experiencing
astounding growth.238 Such arguments are less tenable in the face of the
economic downturn, which caused the Irish and Icelandic economies,
among others, to collapse.239 The Financial Times, for one, has argued that
the key role played by central governments in weathering the eurozone
crisis gives lie to the claim that smaller states are better positioned than
larger ones to withstand fluctuations in the global economy.240
Furthermore, the decreased confidence in the euro complicates calls
for Scottish independence. Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, EU member
states are generally required to adopt the euro as their currency.241 The
United Kingdom, however, is exempt from this rule, and continues to use
the pound sterling.242 Despite arguments by Scottish nationalists to the
contrary,243 it is doubtful that the United Kingdom’s exemption from the
eurozone would apply to an independent Scotland, especially given that
following secession the rump United Kingdom would retain its legal
personality, whereas Scotland would be viewed as a new state.244 An
independent Scotland in the EU might thus be required to adopt the euro at
a time when doing so is less than desirable.
The second link between the eurozone crisis and sub-state nationalism
concerns broader questions of state sovereignty and the future course of
European integration. The economic downturn has precipitated the
emergence of two opposing viewpoints regarding sovereignty within the
EU. The pro-sovereignty view regards the eurozone crisis as emblematic
between Scotland’s financial contribution to the United Kingdom and the subsidies it receives in return
narrows appreciably when North Sea oil revenue is attributed to Scotland).
238. Peter MacMahon, Salmond Sees Scots in “Arc of Prosperity,” SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh), Aug.
11, 2006, at 12, available at http://www.scotsman.com/news/scottish-news/top-stories/salmond-seesscots-in-arc-of-prosperity-1-1130200.
239. See Simon Johnson, Alex Salmond Abandons “Absurd” SNP Economic Strategy, TELEGRAPH
(London), Sept. 14, 2011, 6:27 PM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8763472/
Alex-Salmond-abandons-absurd-SNP-economic-strategy.html (noting the SNP’s abandonment of the
“arc of prosperity” argument).
240. Tony Barber, Europe’s Regions Go It Alone at Their Peril, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2012, 4:37
PM, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d8955a74-4121-11e1-b521-00144feab49a.html.
241. THORP & THOMSON, supra note 203, at 9.
242. See id. (“The UK and Denmark currently have a special status which allows them to decide
when (and if) they wish to adopt the euro as their currency.”).
243. See, e.g., Eddie Barnes, Independent Scotland to Stick with Sterling, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh),
Feb. 2, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/politics/independent_scotland_
to_stick_with_sterling_1_2090953 (detailing SNP finance secretary John Swinney’s proposal to
maintain the pound as Scotland’s currency following independence).
244. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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of fundamental flaws in the idea of European integration and a reason for
states to reassert their sovereign prerogatives. Proponents of this position
have advocated the breakup of the EU or, in the alternative, the creation of
a smaller common currency zone consisting only of the wealthier states of
northern Europe.245 This view of the crisis is evident in Germany’s initial
reluctance to bail out the poorer states of the eurozone and the German
Constitutional Court’s assumption of authority over the question of whether
to engage in a bailout,246 as well as in calls from many British
“Euroskeptics” for the United Kingdom to leave the EU altogether.247 It is
also evident in the resentment of poorer states, such as Greece, towards the
austerity measures imposed by Brussels and Berlin.248
Conversely, the eurozone crisis has bolstered calls for the
establishment of a more fully integrated Europe. This pro-integration
position is premised on the belief that the eurozone crisis demonstrates the
impracticality of sustaining an economic union in the absence of a political
union.249 Taken to its logical conclusion, this process could lead to the
245. See, e.g., Charles Dumas, Op-Ed., A Failed Euro Zone, Financed by Germany, The Opinion
Pages: Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, 2:52 PM, http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2013/01/28/should-the-eu-stick-together/a-failed-euro-zone-financed-by-germany
(arguing that “[t]he euro was a straightforward wrong turn for Europe” and that Germany should exit
the eurozone); Staring into the Abyss, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21536872 (“Some people speculate that Germany might lead a
breakaway core of euro-zone countries.”).
246. See Green Light for ESM: German High Court OKs Permanent Bailout Fund with
Reservations, Spiegel Online International, SPEIGEL ONLINE (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:30 AM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-high-court-oks-permanent-bailout-fund-withreservations-a-855338.html (reporting on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s rejection of a
petition to prevent ratification of the permanent euro bailout fund, but only with the understanding that
any increase in Germany’s contribution to the fund would require German approval).
247. See Stephen Castle, Euro-Skeptics Turn Up Heat on Cameron, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/world/europe/euro-skeptics-turn-up-heat-on-cameron.html
(describing increased support within the Conservative Party for holding a referendum on whether
Britain should withdraw from the EU); see also Making the Break: How Britain Could Fall Out of the
European Union, and What It Would Mean, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2012, at 23, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21567914-how-britain-could-fall-out-european-union-andwhat-it-would-mean-making-break (considering the potential consequences if Britain were to leave the
EU). In January 2013, Prime Minister Cameron pledged to hold a referendum on continued EU
membership by 2017 at the latest. David Cameron Promises In/Out Referendum on EU, BBC News,
BBC.COM (Jan. 23, 2013, 11:50 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148282.
248. See, e.g., Anthee Carassava, Greek General Strike Protests Austerity Measures, L.A. TIMES,
May 11, 2011, at A.3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/11/world/la-fg-greeceausterity-20110512.
249. See Steven Hill, What Will a United States of Europe Look Like?, GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2012,
09:00 EDT, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/mar/21/united-states-europe-transfer-union
(arguing that “there seems little doubt that some sort of United States of Europe is slowly emerging”
and that “[t]he only way forward is some kind of transfer union and some central bank or financial
authority that has the mandate as well as the capacity to guarantee the debt of member states”).
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“United States of Europe” that many proponents of European integration
have long sought.250
The outcome of this debate will have important ramifications for substate nationalists. The breakup or substantial modification of the EU would
impede nationalist goals as presently stated. The primacy of sovereignty
and territorial integrity would be reasserted, and Europe would revert to a
political structure more closely resembling the Westphalian system that
underlies international law’s approach to self-determination and secession.
The foundations of the “Independence in Europe” argument would
therefore be weakened⎯although, by prioritizing statehood, this process
could produce even greater demands for secession. On the other hand, a
Europe that functions politically as a closer union might offer greater
opportunities for Europe’s stateless nations. Admittedly, there are practical
limits on these opportunities: a Europe consisting of dozens upon dozens of
small states might prove unworkable, and “independence” within this
system might bear almost no resemblance to sovereign statehood as
traditionally understood. Indeed, some nationalists might even conclude
that formal independence within a fully integrated Europe is unnecessary.
Nonetheless, it would appear that “Independence in Europe” is a more
realistic possibility within a stronger EU.
Lurking in the background of the debates over sovereignty and
European integration is the third link between sub-state nationalism and the
eurozone crisis: the destructive potential of the political mobilization of
national identity. In many respects, the modern map of Europe is the
product of unchecked nationalism.251 The project of European integration
owes as much, if not more, to the desire to cabin nationalist disputes as it
does to the perceived benefits of a common economic market.252
Nationalism, in the prevailing view, represents a threat to the relative peace
that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War.253
250. Id.; see also Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Comm’n, Speech to the Center for
European Law at the University of Passau: Why We Need a United States of Europe Now (Nov. 8,
2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-796_en.htm (arguing that
European political unification is the solution to the European economic crisis).
251. See, e.g., MACMILLAN, supra note 98, at 109–270 (describing the nationalist disputes at the
heart of the Versailles peace conference following the First World War and the ways in which those
disputes were—or more often were not—resolved).
252. See Traité Instituant La Communauté Economique Européenne [Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community], pmbl., done Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 17, partially translated at
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, EEC Treaty – Original Text (NonConsolidated Version), Summaries of EU Legislation, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm (last updated Oct. 26, 2010) (indicating that
European integration was initially undertaken to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty”).
253. See Coppieters, supra note 162, at 247 (“The EU condemns exclusive types of nationalism as
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The eurozone crisis has spawned a resurgence of right-wing
ultranationalist movements throughout the continent.254 These movements
are frequently xenophobic, violent, and suspicious of (if not hostile
towards) integrationist policies that infringe on state sovereignty. In many
respects, then, they have little in common with Flemish, Scottish, and
Catalan nationalism. The nationalist movements in Scotland and Catalonia
are typically characterized as “civic” and inclusive, resting on shared
geography, institutions, and civil societies rather than on exclusivist notions
of ethnic identity.255 Likewise, the N-VA is often viewed as departing from
the extremist ethnic politics that previously dominated Flemish
nationalism.256 And in all three of these stateless nations, nationalism goes
hand-in-hand with a commitment to European integration.
Yet the success of Flemish, Scottish, or Catalan nationalism could
embolden more divisive nationalist forces elsewhere. The Dutch journalist
Ian Buruma expressed this concern prior to the onset of the eurozone crisis.
Writing in the midst of Belgium’s 2007 political gridlock, Buruma argued
that “[t]he fate of Belgium should interest all Europeans, especially those
morally retrograde and conducive to conflict.”).
254. See, e.g., C.M., Finland’s Election: Truly Amazing, Newsbook, ECONOMIST (Apr. 18, 2011,
13:12), http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/04/finlands_election (noting the success of
the anti-euro True Finn party in Finland); Ian Traynor, Geert Wilders’s Election Success Could Be a
Mini-Earthquake, GUARDIAN, Mar. 4, 2010, 08:53 EST, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/
04/geert-wilders-victory-elections-netherlands (discussing the nationalist, anti-immigrant trend in Dutch
politics symbolized by the electoral success of the Freedom Party and noting that “[s]imilar shifts have
already occurred in Austria with the late Joerg Haider, with the Danish People’s party in Copenhagen,
with the Northern League in Italy or the National Front in France, where the political mainstream has
moved to the right to accommodate the extreme right and co-opt some of their supporters”); Ian
Traynor, Marine Le Pen’s Success Reveals Populists’ Appeal to European Voters, GUARDIAN, Apr. 23,
2012, 07:13 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/23/marine-le-pen-populist-appeal
(describing the success of the far-right Front National in France’s 2012 national elections); William
Wheeler, Op-Ed., Europe’s New Fascists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
11/18/opinion/sunday/europes-new-fascists.html (charting the rise of far-right parties in Greece and
Hungary).
255. See GREER, supra note 44, at 183 (“Scotland and Catalonia are also often cited as admirable
exponents of civic nationalism, of inclusive, diverse national communities free of ethnic exclusivism
and based on healthy civil societies, and the regional settlements in these two countries are widely
admired as models of ethnic conflict regulation.”).
256. Flemish nationalism was long tarnished by collaboration with the Nazi occupation during the
Second World War. See Jan Craeybeckx, From the Great Depression to the Second World War, in
POLITICAL HISTORY OF BELGIUM FROM 1830 ONWARDS 183, 201–08 (Els Witte et al. eds., 2009).
Prior to the recent success of the N-VA, the standard-bearer for Flemish nationalism was the Vlaams
Belang (formerly the Vlaams Blok), which espouses far-right, anti-immigrant policies. LAIBLE, supra
note 6, at 55–56. The N-VA has made strides in distancing itself from the more sordid aspects of
Flemish nationalism’s past. See Buruma, supra note 66, at 38 (“Because Bart De Wever and his party
pointedly avoid the xenophobic rhetoric that’s customary among right-wing populists, they have helped
make Flemish nationalism respectable again, and his electoral gains in Flanders have come, in part, at
the expense of the Vlaams Belang.”).
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who wish the European Union well. For what is happening in Belgium
now could end up happening on a continental scale.”257 Buruma warned
that the process of supranational integration that had weakened the
authority of the Belgian state and provided fertile ground for Flemish
nationalism might also promote similar rifts elsewhere in Europe, with
disastrous consequences: “We know what happened when the twin pulls of
blood and soil determined European politics before. Without having
intended it, the EU now seems to be encouraging the very forces that
postwar European unity was designed to contain.”258 Buruma’s warnings
are particularly relevant now, at a time when many Europeans are falling
back on national pride in the face of global economic uncertainty.
It is thus impossible to consider the future prospects for sub-state
nationalism without also considering the future of the EU. The outcome of
the eurozone crisis will help to determine whether the nationalist projects in
places like Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia succeed in establishing new
states, reach some other form of accommodation with their parent states, or
fail entirely to remake the political map of Europe.
IV. SEPARATISM IN THE MIDST OF INTEGRATION
Writing at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, Christoph Schreuer
observed that
Contemporary international law presupposes [a] structure of co-equal
sovereign States. The international community’s constitutive set-up is
dominated by it. The classical sources of international law depend on
the interaction of States in the form of treaties and customary law.
Diplomatic relations are conducted between States. Official arenas, like
international organizations and international courts, are largely reserved
to States. The protection of individual rights still depends mostly on
diplomatic protection through state representatives. Central concepts of
international law, like sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention,
self-defence or permanent sovereignty over natural resources all rely on
the exclusive or dominant role of the State.259

Of course, the world order that Schreuer described has always been
somewhat of a fiction. Some states are more sovereign than others: by
virtue of their size and strength, they are capable of acting with few
impediments on the world stage, whereas smaller and weaker states often
257. Ian Buruma, Breaking Up is Hard to Do, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 7, 2008, at A17,
available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/breaking-up-is-hard-to-do/article715343/.
258. Id.
259. Schreuer, supra note 224, at 448.
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find their exercise of sovereignty constrained.260 Even within their own
borders, the capacity of states to assert effective control over their
territories and populations varies widely.261 Moreover, non-state actors
have long participated in international affairs and have been recognized as
subjects of international law.262
Nonetheless, sovereign, co-equal states remain at the core of the
international system. Perhaps nowhere is the primacy of statehood more
apparent than in international law’s conception of the right to selfdetermination and its attitude towards secession. Susanna Mancini has
described secession as “at once the most revolutionary and the most
institutionally conservative of political constructs. Its revolutionary
character lies in its ultimate challenge to state sovereignty; its conservative
side, in the reinforcement of the virtues of the latter.”263 International law
has served to blunt the revolutionary potential of self-determination and
reinforce the status quo by, in most cases, upholding the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of existing states.264
For Schreuer, the process of European integration held out the
possibility of a fundamental shift away from the state-centric system
towards a post-sovereignty era.265 And to be sure, the growth of the EU has
altered the nature of statehood in Europe: from trade to the environment,
from immigration to external security, the EU now exercises authority in
many areas traditionally reserved to states.266 Yet at the same time, states
remain the primary actors in the continent’s political system. “Westphalia
is dead . . . . Long live Westphalia.”267
The nationalist movements in Flanders, Scotland, and Catalonia sit on
the borderline between a state-centric international system and an
integrating continent. In its broad contours, the objective of these
260. Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329, 330–33 (2004).
261. See, e.g., Brian Finucane, Fictitious States, Effective Control, and the Use of Force Against
Non-State Actors, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 35, 37 (2012) (“‘Fictitious states’ lack central authority
capable of exercising effective control over a substantial fraction of the territory and population within
their internationally recognized boundaries, making their sovereignty a legal fiction.”).
262. See Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of
Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977, 994 (2011) (“[I]t is irrefutable that traditional international law, even
through the early twentieth century, recognized roles, rights, and duties of nations, tribes, peoples,
belligerents, and other entities and communities in addition to the state, even though their roles were at
times uneven, shifting, complex, and misperceived.”).
263. Susanna Mancini, Secession and Self-Determination, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481, 481 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).
264. See supra Part II.A.
265. See generally Schreuer, supra note 224.
266. PINDER & USHERWOOD, supra note 163, at 104, 114–17, 141–44.
267. Borgen, supra note 7, at 534–35.
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nationalist movements mirrors the objective of nationalists throughout
history: the attainment of sovereign statehood. Yet upon closer inspection,
it is clear that they reflect the realities of the supranational order in which
they find themselves. As Stephen Tierney explains, “it is simplistic to
caricature [the sub-state nationalist phenomenon] as a last desperate
attempt to leap aboard the sinking ship of statehood, just as this vessel
disappears beneath the waves of globalization.”268 Insofar as Flemish,
Scottish, and Catalan nationalists seek statehood, they do so fully aware
of⎯and, indeed, supportive of⎯the limits on sovereignty imposed by the
EU. By, for example, engaging in paradiplomacy and seeking to secure
domestic autonomy, these nationalist movements attempt to carve out a
unique space within the European supranational system and the
constitutional orders of their parent states.269 Consequently, they invite a
rethinking of the content and parameters of statehood and sovereignty.
How should the international community approach the challenges
posed by sub-state nationalism? Tierney, for one, has identified the
predominant state-centric paradigm of international law as a hindrance to
the formal acceptance of the realities of an international system in which
sovereignty is increasingly dispersed both within and beyond state
borders.270 Given the continued primacy of statehood in the international
system, however, it is unlikely that international law will undergo a
fundamental shift in its approaches to statehood, self-determination, or
secession anytime in the near future.
Nonetheless, there are at least three steps that the EU and its member
states could take to engage constructively with sub-state nationalism. First,
consistent with the Canadian Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on
Quebec,271 states faced with separatist movements should consider allowing
for referendums to gauge support for separation. There is no reason why
the democratic principles that guided the Canadian Supreme Court’s
framework for negotiated secession should not apply with equal force in
democracies like Spain, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. Britain’s
response to Scottish nationalism has already started down this path, with
the British state allowing for a referendum despite its strong opposition to

268. Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary
Challenges to the Nation-State, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 168 (2005).
269. Id. at 168–75.
270. See id. at 170 (“In fact it is in many respects international law rather than the constitutional
order of their own States which has held back radical approaches to shared sovereignty within particular
multinational States.”).
271. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
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Scottish independence.272 Spain should consider following suit in the event
that Catalan nationalists continue to seek a plebiscite to determine their
future relationship with the Spanish state.
Where independence referendums might diverge from the Canadian
Supreme Court’s opinion, however, is on the issue of how referendum
questions should be framed. To be sure, referendum questions must be
written with clarity to ensure that voters understand the choice that is being
presented to them. But that choice need not be limited to either outright
independence or continued inclusion in the state.273 Rather, a question that
allows for some political arrangement short of full independence would
better reflect the extent to which political authority is already dispersed
within states. “Devolution max” will not be on the ballot when Scottish
voters go to the polls.274 Yet the increased autonomy envisioned by that
proposal might have been sufficient to satisfy many Scottish nationalists.
By taking the option off the table and making the referendum an all-ornothing affair, the British government is running the risk that many
Scottish voters might instead opt for independence.
Second, the EU should consider expanding the formal opportunities
for sub-state regions to participate in EU policymaking. For example, the
EU could elevate the Committee of the Regions to what amounts to a
fourth branch of government, on par with the Commission, Council, and
Parliament. It could also require (rather than simply condone) the
participation of regional ministers in EU policymaking that touches on
areas of regional competency. Strengthening the role of the regions at the
supranational level would be consistent with the important role that regions
already play within many EU member states. It would also be consistent
with a broad interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity275 and might
make sense if the EU emerges from the eurozone crisis with a firmer
commitment to integration.276 To be sure, there is always the possibility
that expanding the role of the regions at the EU level could increase
support for separation. But it could also reduce separatist tensions by
making statehood less of a prerequisite for formal participation in the
European project.
Third, the EU should clarify its position on how it would deal with
secession from a member state. Because each instance of secession would

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Edinburgh Agreement, supra note 58.
See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
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raise its own unique issues, it is impossible for the EU to set out in detail all
of the possible consequences of separation.
But the broad
question⎯whether a new state would automatically succeed to
membership, whether it could negotiate membership on more streamlined
terms, or whether it would be required to accede to membership through
the EU’s normal application procedures⎯is one that the EU should be in a
position to answer.277 Given the significance of the EU to the ways in
which sub-state nationalists define their interests and identities, all of the
parties to these separatist disputes would benefit from greater clarity
concerning the future that awaits a secessionist state.278 It would, in short,
go a long way towards shaping what Bruno Coppieters has termed “a
strategic European culture with respect to secession.”279
The purpose of these three steps would not be to make secession
easier or more likely. Rather, they would acknowledge the fact that “[i]n
the case of EU member states or prospective member states, the EU will be
perceived as a potential institutional framework within which conflict
transformation and resolution may take place.”280 Indeed, the end result
may very well be to dampen support for secession. As Susanna Mancini
has argued, “demonizing secession, turning it into a constitutional taboo,
often adds fuel to secessionist claims. On the other hand, if secession is
constructed as one among the many rights and options offered to a state’s
subnational groups, chances are that it will lose much of its appeal.”281 If
stateless nations perceive that “Independence in Europe” is a possibility, it
may free them to redirect their agendas away from separatism towards
other forms of accommodation within both their parent states and the EU.
Furthermore, the way in which the EU addresses self-determination
claims could have important ramifications beyond Europe. To be sure, the
EU’s level of supranational integration is without parallel in other parts of
the world. Moreover, the peaceful and democratic nature of Western
Europe’s separatist disputes⎯the lack, as one journalist quipped, of
“Wallonian death squads roaming the Flemish countryside”282⎯is at odds
277. See supra Part III.B.
278. For a sense of the level of confusion among EU member states on this issue, see Glenn
Campbell, Scottish Independence: Scotland and EU Membership, BBC News, BBC.COM (Feb. 27, 2013,
19:11 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21602456 (summarizing the
varied responses of member states to the question of how the EU would handle Scottish independence).
279. Coppieters, supra note 162, at 254–56.
280. Id. at 256.
281. Mancini, supra note 263, at 482.
282. Joshua Keating, Why Belgium Matters (No, Seriously), Foreign Policy Passport, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Nov. 15, 2007, 1:33 PM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2007/11/15/why_belgium_
matters_no_seriously.
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with the circumstances prevailing in the many states where separatist
conflicts fuel violence and political instability. There would appear to be
less at stake in Scotland or Catalonia than in Kashmir or Kurdistan. But the
environment in which Western Europe’s separatist disputes play out offers
a stable space in which to attempt unique solutions to self-determination
claims that might have value elsewhere. These solutions need not reflect
the state/non-state duality inherent in current conceptions of the right to
self-determination, but rather could be built on more nuanced
interpretations of statehood and sovereignty. As Nico Krisch has observed,
“[i]nternational law doesn’t have much on offer, but the EU might be the
place to invent intermediate forms.”283
CONCLUSION
So will they stay or will they go? That question will begin to be
answered in the autumn of 2014, when the people of Scotland go to the
polls to decide their political future. It would be foolhardy to predict the
outcome of Scotland’s referendum or to speculate on whether Catalans will
follow through on their demands for “Independence Now!”,284 or whether
Bart De Wever will ultimately succeed in snuffing out Belgium “like a
candle.”285 There are an abundance of reasons why they might stay, such
as the high degree of autonomy that they already possess at home, the
extent to which the EU allows them to operate both formally and
informally abroad, and the uncertainty of their position vis-à-vis the EU if
they were to secede. But the lure of independence within a supranational
Europe might yet convince them to go.
What can be predicted, however⎯and what this article has sought to
explain⎯is that the EU will play a leading role in determining the outcome
of Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalist claims. The right to selfdetermination as currently understood in international law provides little in
the way of guidance for addressing separatist claims in Europe’s stateless
nations or, for that matter, in other parts of the world. In many respects,
self-determination has become “a principle without a purpose⎯a right
bereft of potential beneficiaries.”286
In Europe, however, selfdetermination claims will increasingly be dealt with through the institutions
of the EU, as part of the ongoing push and pull among the EU, its member

283. Nico Krisch, Catalonia’s Independence: A Reply to Joseph Weiler, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 18,
2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/catalonias-indepence-a-reply-to-joseph-weiler/.
284. Ortiz & Toyer, supra note 1.
285. Buruma, supra note 66, at 36.
286. Simpson, supra note 111, at 259.
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states, and sub-state regions. Whether this results in “Independence in
Europe” or some form of accommodation short of secession remains to be
seen.

